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“Fight the Power!: Youth and Social Change.” So was the name of the course I first 
attended in my freshman year as an undergraduate student at St. Lawrence University. 
At the end of a brief introductory session, Prof. John Collins posed the toughest 
question I have been asked so far: “Politically speaking, who are you?” The question 
was to be answered in the form of a speech to be addressed before the class the 
following week. It has been eight years since then, and I am yet to answer it. This thesis 
shall be an attempt to complete that assignment. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
MILITARISM IN TURKEY AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AS AN 
ANTIMILITARIST ACT OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
 
 
 
ERKİNALP KESİKLİ 
 
M.A. in European Studies Program 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Ayşe Kadıoğlu 
 
Keywords: Militarism, Conscientious Objection, Human Rights, Civil Disobedience, 
Social Movements 
 
 
 
The Republic of Turkey is established on a hegemonic founding ideology that is 
centralist, unitarist and militarist. One of the two major means of maintaining and 
justifying this ideology is compulsory military service. The fact that Turkey remains the 
only member state to the Council of Europe that does not recognize conscientious 
objection and the heavy sentences it gives to conscientious objectors make the 
functional and ideological essence of military service visible. On one hand, the various 
coup d’etats, the significance of general staff in decision making, the inauditability of 
military expenditures, the independence of the military judiciary, and the power of 
militarily-owned companies in economy make the military an autonomous institution 
with great impact on the state. On the other hand, military has rised to the level of 
publicly highest regarded institution, the military service appears as a culturalized 
establishment along with its values and ethnically and sexually coded hierarchy. In this 
framework, the acts of civil disobedience taken by the conscientious objectors in Turkey 
along with their criticisms on the Kurdish issue, militarism, nationalism, androcentrism 
and heterosexism do not simply initiate a discussion of citizenship but shatter the core 
values upon which the state is founded. Considering that the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe has been putting forth recommendations to Turkey for 
recognizing the right to conscientious objection, and the criticisms of the European 
Commission on Turkey’s democratic credentials based on the decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights, the issue merits academic attention both in the area of human 
rights and in European Studies. This study argues that conscientious objection 
movement, due its radical but nonviolent nature, carries a transformative potential that 
can alter the static mindset of the Turkish nation with regards to cultural militarization, 
and push the Turkish state for further democratization and civilianization via its claims 
for conscientious objection. 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE’DE MİLİTARİZM VE ANTİMİLİTARİST BİR SİVİL 
İTAATSİZLİK EYLEMİ OLARAK VİCDANİ RET 
 
 
 
ERKİNALP KESİKLİ 
 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ayşe Kadıoğlu 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler:  
Militarizm, Vicdani Ret, İnsan Hakları, Sivil İtaatsizlik, Toplumsal Hareketler  
 
 
 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, merkeziyetçi, üniter ve militer bir hegemon kurucu ideoloji 
üzerine yapılandırılmıştır. Bu ideolojiyi kalıcı ve meşru kılmanın iki ana yönteminden 
birisi zorunlu askerlik hizmetidir. Türkiye’nin Avrupa Konseyi’ne üye devletler 
arasında vicdani reddi tanımayan tek devlet olması ve vicdani retçilerine veriği 
cezaların ağırlığı, askerlik hizmetinin işlevselliğini ve ideolojik özünü açığa 
çıkarmaktadır. Bir yandan, darbeler, genel kurmayın karar vermedeki ağırlığı, ordu 
harcamalarının denetlenemezliği, askeri yargının bağımsızlığı, orduya ait şirketlerin 
ekonomideki gücü, orduyu, devlet üzerinde büyük güce sahip otonom bir kurum 
kılmıştır. Diğer yandan, ordu, toplumun en çok güvendiği kurum seviyesine yükselmiş, 
askerlik hizmeti de beraberinde getirdiği değerler, etnik ve cinsel bağlamda tanımlanmış 
hiyerarşisi ile kültürelleşmiştir. Bu çerçevede, Türkiye’deki vicdani retçiler tarafından 
ortaya konan sivil itaatsizlik eylemleri, Kürt sorunu, militarizm, milliyetçilik, erkek 
egemenlik ve hetoroseksizme dair eleştirileri yalnızca vatandaşlık konusunda bir 
tartışma açmakla kalmaz, aynı zamanda söz konusu devletin temelini oluşturan 
değerleri de sarsar. Avrupa Konseyi Parlamenterler Meclisi’nin Türkiye’ye vicdani ret 
hakkını tanıması için yaptığı davetler ve Avrupa Komisyonu’nun Avrupa İnsan Hakları 
Mahkemesi içtihadını temel alarak Türkiye’nin demokratikliği hakkında yaptığı 
eleştiriler göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, konunun hem insan hakları hem de Avrupa 
Çalışmaları alanlarında arz ettiği önem açığa çıkar. Bu çalışma, radikal olduğu kadar 
şiddetsiz olan vicdani ret hareketinin, Türk ulusunun kültürel militarizasyon 
bağlamındaki static zihniyetini dönüştürebilmek, ve vicdani redde ilişkin ortaya 
koyduğu talepler ile Türkiye devletini demokratikleştirmek ve sivilleştirmek yolunda 
önemli bir potansiyele sahip olduğunu savunur. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Among the many challenges the Republic of Turkey has faced through its 
candidature for the European Union is its practice of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of its citizens. Instead of an all-embracing constitutional citizenship 
framework based on rights, Turkey has held onto a citizenship based on duties and 
responsibilities, one of which is mandatory military service. Of all the member states in 
the Council of Europe, Turkey remains to be the only state not to recognize the right to 
conscientious objection to military service nor offer substitutive civilian service. This 
situation remains unchanged despite the convictions against Turkey in the five cases at 
the European Court of Human Rights, four of which were based on freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.  
Considering the fact that Turkey accepts the superiority and binding nature of 
international law, the potential reasons for its insistence in not taking the necessary steps 
regarding the said right are thought provoking. Moreover, the minor social movement 
that demands this right using an antimilitarist rhetoric hints to a connection that merits 
academic attention.  
This thesis aims to see the connections between Turkey’s hesitancy in 
implementing legislation on conscientious objection and the conscientious objection 
activists who define the reason for this hesitancy as Turkey’s militarism. So as to 
establish the connection between the two, a three level study was made. The first level 
was an effort to understand the various conceptions of militarism, conscientious 
objection, and the connections between. The second level was an attempt to see the 
militarist elements in Turkish politics and society. The third level constituted a close 
look at the conscientious objection movement in Turkey. The research was done mostly 
based on secondary sources, supported also by interviews with conscientious objectors, 
members of political parties and NGOs. 
The three-level analysis finds its reflection on the structure of the thesis as well. 
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The first chapter aims at establishing the theoretical connection between militarism and 
conscientious objection. Towards this aim, five sections will used. Firstly, the terms 
“militarism” and “militarization” will be defined, and their transformation throughout 
the past two centuries will be presented. In the second section, the connections between 
military conscription and the modern state will be sought, followed by a discussion on 
citizenship so as to put the conscript-state relations into perspective. The third section 
will host a theoretical debate on whether conscientious objection to law could be 
considered an act of civil disobedience, followed by a secondary level where the same 
question will be posed for conscientious objection to military service. In the fourth 
section a history of the conscientious objection to military service will be presented, 
along with its variants and practice today. Under the light of these four sections, the 
final section will attempt to answer the question as to whether conscientious objection 
to compulsory military service could be considered an act of civil disobedience of an 
antimilitarist nature. 
The second chapter will attempt to see how militarism has penetrated Turkish 
politics and society. In the first section of the chapter, the authorities of the Turkish 
Armed Forces will be examined politically, judicially, and economically, so as to 
answer whether the power of military in the given system secures its position as the 
ultimate beneficiary. In the second section, the role of the military in the social realm 
will be examined by analyzing Turkey’s state-making process and the weight that 
military carries in Turkish culture. 
The final chapter will focus on when the term “conscientious objection” has 
appeared in Turkey; reactions of the public and the state to the idea; whether the idea 
was able to create a base of social support; whether it has become a movement; 
divisions among the objectors; interaction and cooperation between conscientious 
objectors, other NGOs and political parties; the legal implications of the term, and 
future prospects for the objectors. 
In conclusion, the militarist features of the Turkish Republic will be matched 
with the arguments of conscientious objectors, eventually establishing the connection 
sought at the beginning.  
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CHAPTER 1 
MILITARISM AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to establish the theoretical connection between 
militarism and conscientious objection. Towards this aim, five sections will follow. 
Firstly, the terms “militarism” and “militarization” will be defined, and their 
transformation throughout the past two centuries will be presented, so as to lay the 
conceptual foundation for the chapter. In the second section, the connections between 
military conscription and the modern state will be sought, followed by a discussion on 
citizenship so as to put the conscript-state relations into perspective. The third section 
will host a theoretical debate on whether conscientious objection to law could be 
considered an act of civil disobedience, followed by a secondary level where the same 
question will be posed for conscientious objection to military service. In the fourth 
section a history of the conscientious objection to military service will be presented, 
along with its variants and practice today. Under the light of these four sections, the 
final section will attempt to answer the question as to whether conscientious objection 
to compulsory military service could be considered an act of civil disobedience of an 
antimilitarist nature. 
 
 
1.1.Militarism and Militarization  
 
Although militarism and militarization tend to be used interchangeably, it is 
important to draw the distinction in between the two before establishing the framework 
for the chapter. Historian Volker Berghahn traces the term militarism back to the 
memoirs of Madame de Chastenay, who had used it to refer to Napoleon’s glorification 
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of war.
1
 Considering that it was also Napoleon who introduced compulsory military 
service, this reference is especially significant for the purposes of this thesis as it 
reflects the core connection between militarism and compulsory military service. 
Jan Oberg, in an effort to present a history of the different conceptualizations of 
militarism, points to Herbert Spencer. Spencer provides a social Darwinist interpretation 
of social progression from a “militant society” into an “industrial society;” i.e., a 
development from an undifferentiated society structured around hierarchy and 
obedience into a differentiated society structured around voluntary and contractually 
assumed social obligations.
2
 According to this evolutionist theory of Spencer, the 
“militant society” was organized around combat so as to serve the ultimate goal of self-
preservation. In the combatant section of the militant society the individual was owned 
by the state; his life was at the disposal of the society. All individualities in life, liberty 
and property had to be subordinated. Men had to lose their individuality as a unit and 
conform to their status in the regimented structure. Nevertheless, the regimented 
organization of the combatant part of Spencer’s militant society had affected the non-
combatant part as well. The military head grew into a civil head in times of peace, 
creating a permanent commissariat. Usually at once, and in exceptional cases at last, 
militancy continued. The regulative policies permeated any sphere possible, making the 
non-combatant body subservient in the wider system of “graduated subordination”. 
Individuals who did not bear arms had to spend their lives furthering the maintenance of 
those who did. The non-combatant body had to follow the principle of “compulsory 
cooperation.” 3  For the purposes of this chapter, Spencer’s theory is significant for 
describing how the regimented military organization reflects itself on the non-
combatant part of the society even in times of peace.  
                                                          
1
 Volker R. Berghahn and Hugh Bicheno, “Militarism,” Oxford Companion to Military 
History, http://www.answers.com/topic/militarism-2. 
2
 Jan Oberg, “The New International Military Order: a Threat to Human Security” in 
Problems of Contemporary Militarism, ed. Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee (London: 
Croom Helm, 1980), 72. 
3
 Herbert Spencer, “The Militant Type of Society,” in Herbert Spencer, Political 
Institutions, being Part V of the Principles of Sociology (London: Williams and 
Norgate, 1882); also available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1336&ch
apter=54831&layout=html&Itemid=27#a_1319166. 
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The term militarism entered into the political jargon also around this period, 
when in 1864, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon took up the term militarism to attack the 
authoritarian mentality that signified war as the best means of mobilizing men’s energy. 
He used militarism to describe “the army-ruled, essentially monarchist and centralized 
state and the associated financial burden.” A century later, Alfred Vagts agreed with 
Proudhon by describing how militarism imposed heavy burdens on civilians for military 
purposes, caused the neglect of welfare and culture, and led to the waste of nations’ best 
man power in “unproductive army service.”4 After Proudhon, the term began to be 
discussed in two meanings; one was the penetration of military interests into political 
decision-making, and the other was “social militarism,” reflecting the permeating of 
military values and mentalities into civil society—this second meaning will also 
constitute the basis of the term militarization as defined below. 
Spencer and Proudhon along with some other 19
th
 century philosophers were 
later criticized for detaching militarism from socioeconomic structures and leaving it 
entirely as a way of thinking, as a reminiscence from pre-capitalist and pre-industrialist 
periods.
5
 19
th
 century socialist thinkers viewed militarism as one of the manifestations 
of capitalist societies—militarism, as they saw it, arose from the nature of the capitalist 
mode of production.
6
 Among them was Rosa Luxemburg, who described militarism as 
“an inexhaustible and increasingly lucrative source of capitalist gain” due to “the 
incessant technical innovations of the military and the incessant increase in its 
expenditures.”7  
The two world wars left a deep impact on the way militarism evolved in the 20
th
 
century. The totalitarian states of the interwar era served as the stage for mass 
mobilization around values and ideas conveyed through militarism. Cold War provided 
yet another strong opportunity for rearmament despite development, as well as a strong 
motive for social control. Although certain historians such as Berghahn suggested that 
“with the end of the Cold War, the concept of militarism has lost most of the ideological 
                                                          
4
 Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism, Civilian and Military (London: Hollis and 
Carter, 1959), 14. 
5
 Jan Oberg, “The New International Military Order,” 60. 
6
 Ulrich Albrecht, “Militarism and Underdevelopment,” in Problems of Contemporary 
Militarism, ed. Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 107. 
7
 Rosa Luxemburg, “The Militia and Militarism,” in Selected Political Writings, ed. 
Robert Looker (New York: Random House, 1972), also available at 
http://marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1899/02/26.htm. 
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steam that seemed to make it worth discussing,”8 criticism on the concept revived in the 
21
st
 century with the war on terror. 
Today, militarism has gained a wider meaning that extends beyond the 
battlefield and finds its best embodiment in peacetime practices. As Murat Belge points 
out, militarism is both as an “ideology” and a “practice” that is oriented at and seeks to 
alter and shape the society in, what Vagts calls, the “military way.”9 In Michael Clare’s 
definition, militarism is “a dynamic condition characterized by the progressive 
expansion of the military over the civilian.” This dynamism represents both the 
tendency of the military apparatus to assume control over the politics and economy of a 
state, and the increasing domination of military goals and military values over the lives 
and behavior of its citizens. Within the military apparatus, Clare includes the armed 
forces, the associated paramilitary, intelligence agencies and bureaucratic agencies; she 
argues that goals such as preparation of war, acquisition of weaponry, development of 
military industries, and values such as centralization of authority, hierarchy, discipline, 
conformity, combativeness and xenophobia would dominate the civilian sphere.
10
 This 
domination, unlike Spencer’s description of the 19th century militant society, does not 
aim self-preservation; its goal, as Vagts puts it, is to serve military men. As modern 
armies lost their instrumentality of constant combat, today, in peacetime, the military 
“exists for diversion or to satisfy peacetime whims like the long-anachronistic cavalry.” 
Hence, Vagts describes militarism as narcissistic, and argues that it “flourishes more in 
peacetime than in war.”11 
In contrast to the militarism that is implemented by the military elite for the 
benefit of the military elite, Vagts also offers an alternative term, “civilian militarism,” 
“defined as the unquestioning embrace of military values, ethos, 
principles, attitudes; as ranking military institutions and considerations 
above all others in the state; as finding the heroic predominantly in 
military service and action, including war—to the preparation of which 
the nation’s main interest and resources must be dedicated, with the 
inevitability and goodness of war always presumed.”12 
                                                          
8
 Berghahn and Bicheno, “Militarism.” 
9
 Murat Belge, Militarist Modernleşme: Almanya, Japonya ve Türkiye (İstanbul: 
İletişim, 2011), 150. 
10
 Michael T. Clare, “Militarism: the Issues Today,” in Problems of Contemporary 
Militarism, ed. Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 36.  
11
 Vagts, A History of Militarism, 17. 
12
 Ibid., 453. 
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Paying these military values, institutions and interests such high regard, argues 
Vagts, leads to the advocacy of military values and practice of military hierarchy in the 
totality of a nation’s life. Hence, in his definition, Michael Mann emphasizes the social 
goals underlying militarism: “Militarism is the persistent use of organised military 
violence in pursuit of social goals.”13 This social acceptance of militarism and the goals 
underlie brings us to militarization. 
Catherine Lutz defines militarization as “the contradictory and tense social 
process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence.”14 This 
process is both material and ideological. On one hand it includes reinvigoration of labor 
and resources allocated to military purposes, as well as synchronization of all 
institutions with military goals. On the other hand it is a discursive process leading to 
the alteration of general societal beliefs and values so as to legitimate the use of force, 
organization of large standing armies, as well as higher taxes and tribute paid for them; 
as part of this discursive process, national histories are also shaped in ways that glorify 
and legitimate military action. She describes how the military along with its industrial 
corporate power have helped make “a military definition of reality” the common sense, 
along with the assumptions on human nature being aggressive and territorial—
effectively conjoining the Leviathan with the militant society of Spencer in the world of 
the 21st century.  
Cynthia Enloe also takes on the idea of making the military values and ideas 
common sense. She defines militarization as “a step-by-step process by which a person 
or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its 
well-being on militaristic ideas.”15 According to Enloe, as an individual or a society gets 
to be transformed by militarization, that individual or society begins not only to value 
those militaristic presumptions, but also regards them as normal.  
                                                          
13
 Michael Mann, “Authoritarian and Liberal Militarism: a Contribution from 
Comparative and Historical Sociology,” in International Theory: Positivism and 
Beyond, edited by Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 224. 
14
 Catherine Lutz, quoting Michael Geyer. Cathrine Lutz, “Making War at Home in the 
United States: Militarization and the Current Crisis,” American Anthropologist, 104/3 
(2002), 723. 
15
 Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: the International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives 
(Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 2000), 3. 
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In agreement with Proudhon and Vagts, Lutz also speaks about the “deformation 
of human potentials” via militarization, but takes a gender oriented approach; she 
emphasizes the hierarchies of race, class, gender and sexuality evident in the military 
and militarized society.
16  
The hierarchy that Lutz points to is termed by Raewyn 
Connell as “hegemonic masculinity,” and is defined as “a cultural dynamic,” a 
“configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the 
problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees the dominant position of men 
and the subordination of women.”17 Ultimately, Paul Higate and John Hopton situate 
Connell’s theory of masculinity into Lutz’s militarized hierarchy. They argue that 
military organizations and rituals represent the endorsement of one model of 
masculinity that is characterized by the interrelations between stoicism, phallocentricity, 
domination of weaker individuals, competitiveness, and heroic achievement. Those men 
who accord to this model tend to have a higher social status. Public demonstration of 
conforming to this model affirms their masculinity, whereas those who do not yield to 
this model are tacitly signified as targets for legitimate brutality.
18
 
In the light of the given conceptualizations, militarism can be defined as a 
racially and sexually coded exclusivist ideology advocating the expansion of the 
military over the civilian, and militarization as the process through which the society 
organizes itself around military interests, values and structure, ultimately implementing 
militarism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Ibid., 725. 
17
 Raewn Connell, Masculinities (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 2005), 77. 
18
 Paul Higate and John Hopton, “War, Militarism and Masculinities,” in Handbook of 
Studies on Men and Masculinities, ed. Michael S. Kimmel, Jeff Hearn and R. W. 
Connell (Thousand Oaks and London: Sage, 2005), 433-434. 
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1.2. Conscription 
 
1.2.1. Conscription and the State 
 
Max Weber defined the state as “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory,” 19  and Thomas Hobbes was the first to found state 
structure that monopolized the use of legitimate force based on the principle of consent. 
In his interpretation, humans would use violence to achieve their three major inner 
desires, i.e., gain, safety, and reputation, which would cause a constant natural state of 
war. The only way to overcome such a state would be the establishment of a “common 
power to fear. … Where there is no common Power, there is no Law; Where no Law, no 
Injustice.” 20  Such would be the legitimatization of an “absolute monarch” with all 
authorities, providing the masses with a reason to give “consent” to the common power, 
and hence creating the basis for the Hobbesian social contract.  
If the primary monopoly that the modern state held was over means of violence, 
the second was over the collection of taxes. Since it was the monarch who granted the 
people with protection, as the ultimate power in full control of all military forces, he 
was entitled to collecting taxes for maintaining the army as well as the bureaucracy. As 
Hobbes put it, “they that give to a man the right of government in sovereignty are 
understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers, and of 
appointing magistrates for the administration of justice.”21 
Charles Tilly, however, denormalizes this uncontested entitlement of the state, 
and describes how tax collection was transformed from being a coercive measure to a 
regular resource for the state. He defines soldiers and landlords as the two major 
overlapping groups of coercion, whose accumulative and coercive means led to the 
creation of states: 
“When the accumulation and concentration of coercive means grow 
together, they produce states; they produce distinct organizations that 
control the chief concentrated means of coercion within well defined 
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territories, and exercise priority in some respects over all other 
organizations operating within those territories.”22 
 
The state, then, becomes not only a structure that monopolizes the means of 
violence, but by building its civil establishment upon it as well, becomes militarist by 
nature. The military appears as the manifestation of the state; as Ulrich Bröckling put it, 
“if there is no army at disposal at all times, the sovereign is not either.”23 
The introduction of conscription and the concept of nation-in-arms, however, 
brought a new dynamic to the social contract that contradicted the Hobbesian contract. 
Whereas the citizens had waved certain liberties in exchange for the state and the 
protection of life, conscription, as Alan Baker noted, demanded both the surrender of 
one’s liberty, and the sacrifice of one’s life for one’s country.24 
Margaret Levi describes the history of military conscription in modern states as 
“the story of the changing relationship between the state and its citizens.” 25  Eugen 
Weber describes the aversion towards the military in 19
th
 century France; “soldiers were 
treated like an army of occupation” and “soldier and officer are more ill regarded than 
in enemy country.”26 Presenting conscription as an acceptable policy bargain to the 
society, argues Levi, “requires the creation of a shared community that overrides the 
particularistic social groupings with which many people identify.”27 These communities 
were nations; as “cultural artifacts,” in Benedict Anderson’s terminology, they 
constituted the image of the communion for which people felt deep attachments.
28
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1.2.2. Conscription and Citizenship 
 
The utilization of the citizen as the tool by and through which the state practices 
violence, inescapably opens the discussion of citizenship and forces one to question the 
position of the citizen in the eyes of the state.  
T. H. Marshall, defines citizenship as “full membership of a community,” and 
argues that citizenship is constituted of three elements, which are civil, political and 
social rights. The civil rights are the rights necessary for individual freedom, including 
freedom of speech, conscience and equality before the law. For they are exercised 
within a society, the rights in this category are dependent on whether the government 
respects the autonomy of the individual. The second group of rights are the rights that 
provides the individual with the opportunity to participate in political life, including 
voting, being elected or holding public office. These rights are dependent on universal 
suffrage, equality and democratic government. The third group of rights are the social 
rights which grants the citizen with a minimum social status, including basic economic 
welfare, social security, and are dependent on the development of welfare state and the 
extension of state responsibilities into economic and social life.
29
   
As for Marshall’s theory, two points tenders importance. First is the passive 
condition to which Marshall reduces the citizen as the recipient of rights, whereas many 
of the rights he categorized were products of social struggles. This portrayal of the state 
as who bestows rights, justifies the state’s demands for duties from its citizens—as the 
state had delivered its—and delegitimizes any further demands or acts of disobedience. 
The second point is the lack of a fourth group of rights, that is cultural rights, which 
includes, for example, the right to speak one’s native language and the right to express 
one’s identity. This point is significant especially for the conscripts of unitary nation-
states, as a categorization of citizenship that disregards cultural rights delegitimizes 
liberation movements of ethnic, religious and sexual minorities among others. 
Adrian Oldfield’s 1990 theory offers a categorization based on rights and 
responsibilities.
30
 To Oldfield, Western citizenship can be evaluated in two categories. 
The first category is referred to as “liberal” or “liberal-individualism,” and bears a 
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conception of citizenship as “status.” In this conception, the individual’s status as a 
citizen is cherished. Each individual is considered sovereign and morally autonomous. 
The “needs and entitlements” emphasized as part of the conception are considered as 
requirements for individuals to remain effective agents in the world. Individuals interact 
with each other on the basis of contract, therefore the individual does not possess any 
duty or responsibility for the society but that on the contract. Due to the emphasis on the 
individual, the liberal conception is essentially “private.” 
The second category that Oldfield offers is “classical” or “civic-republican” 
which bears a conception of citizenship as a “practice.” Contrary to the emphasis on 
individualism and “the private” in the liberal conception, the classical conception 
cherishes “the community.” The “needs and entitlements” of the liberal conception are 
replaced by “duties”—hence the emphasis on “practice.” So as to be regarded as 
citizens, individuals require the “empowering” of others. They gain their autonomy only 
through socially defined practices, which ultimately ensure social solidarity and 
cohesion in the community. Thus, this emphasis on the community is the manifestation 
that civic-republican citizenship is not only based on practice but is also an “attitude of 
mind.” 
Oldfield’s analysis is significant as the civic-republican conception of 
citizenship he provides reflects the relations between the state and the conscript, as well 
as the society the judgments of whom defines his position in the hierarchy.  
 
 
1.3. Conscientious Objection and Civil Disobedience 
 
The term civil disobedience entered into the dictionaries with Henry David 
Thoreau’s 1849 essay, “Resistance to Civil Government.” The essay posthumously re-
appeared as “On the Duty of Civil Disobedience,” in opposition to the chapter “Duty of 
Submission to Civil Government” in William Paley’s 1785 book – which he fiercely 
criticizes in the essay.
31
 Despite the fact that the term was used in the essay as such,
32
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Thoreau’s work is particularly important not only because he introduced this widely 
influential concept, but also because at the root of his objection laid conscientious 
objection to war. 
In writing the essay, Thoreau had one clear goal, which was to explain why he 
had not paid poll tax for six years. The reason was his opposition to slavery and the 
Mexican War. In his eyes, democracy required consent from the citizen; by not paying 
his “duty” as a citizen, he was pronouncing his objection to the named policies, or in his 
words, he was “resign[ing] his conscience to the legislator”. The government was 
fallible, “liable to be abused and perverted before the people [could] act through it.” The 
individual was on equal footing with, if not higher than, the government. “Any man 
more right than his neighbors constitute[d] a majority of one;” therefore, the withdrawal 
of one individual from their partnership with the state, argued Thoreau, would be the 
end of the opposed policy—in this case, slavery. Thus, he advocated “disobedience to 
the State.”  
Whether Thoreau overemphasized the power of the individual as the resistor was 
later taken up by philosophers such as Hannah Arendt. Furthermore, his objection to the 
Mexican War as an “unjust war,” along with his treatise of concepts such as conscience, 
objection, unjust laws/wars/governments, have served as an ideological pathway for the 
absolutist
33
 conscientious objectors of World War I as well as the Vietnam War.
34
 
In 1961, Hugo Bedau made a categorization for civil disobedience that many 
followed: “Anyone commits an act of civil disobedience if and only if he acts illegally, 
publicly, nonviolently, and conscientiously with the intent to frustrate (one of) the laws, 
policies, or decisions of his government.”35 According Bedau, the act had to be illegal, 
because if the “dissenter,” as Bedau  referred to his subject, found a particular law, 
policy or decision unjustifiable he had to act against it, i.e., violate it—after all, civil 
disobedience was not just done, it was “committed.” It had to be public, for it was the 
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only way that authorities could know of his act, if the dissenter intended a change in 
policy. It had to be nonviolent, both to avoid the backlash of state violence, and more 
importantly so, to keep the act “civil.” Another reason for the law to be nonviolent, as 
John Rawls had later explained, was to reflect “fidelity to law,” that is, accepting the 
legal consequences of the act. Here, fidelity is significant in proving to the majority that 
the act is politically sincere and directed at public’s sense of justice.36 It had to be 
conscientiously motivated; the dissenter had to be able to justify his act based on his 
political or moral convictions. Finally, it had to have the intention to frustrate the law 
not by “direct action” where the body of the dissenter becomes the tool of action, but by 
designing the act in a way so that the act itself would hamper or prevent the government 
from enforcing the law.  
The final characteristic that Bedau offered is significant as it makes it clear that 
to have a government change a law, the applicability or enforcement of the law has to 
be hampered. The only way that this could be possible, on the other hand, is having the 
act committed by a “large minority.” Hannah Arendt concurs; as she views it, the civil 
disobedient “never exists as a single individual; he can function and survive only as a 
member of a group… Civil disobedience practiced by a single individual is unlikely to 
have much effect.”37 She views civil disobedients as individuals gathered around a 
“common opinion” so as to take a stand against government’s policies, which are 
backed by a majority. Based on this classification, she draws a distinction between civil 
disobedients and conscientious objectors. The latter, as she sees it, raise arguments in 
defense of individual conscience or individual acts, hence are not organized around a 
common opinion; they are rather individuals sharing a common interest. Conscientious 
objection, she argues, is “inadequate when applied to civil disobedience.”38 
Similar to Arendt, Rawls also tries to establish a counter idea to civil 
disobedience: “conscientious refusal.” In defining civil disobedience, Rawls takes 
Bedau as reference, and builds his theory upon his. Also parallel to Rawls, he 
emphasizes nonviolence. Civil disobedience, he argues, “is clearly distinct from militant 
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action and obstruction; it is far removed from organized forcible resistance.” 39 
Conscientious refusal, on the other hand, is “noncompliance with a more or less direct 
legal injunction or administrative order.” Neither is it a form of address appealing to the 
sense of justice of the majority, nor is it based merely on political foundations. The act 
may be secretive or covert, and may be based on religious foundations that concern only 
the subject.  
H.J. McCloskey offers a categorization around “conscientious disobedience.” He 
argues that there can be two types of conscientious disobedience to the law. One is the 
basic moral rejection to the law, “conscientious objection,” rooted in a person’s refusal 
to take or abstain from taking an action due to his/her integrity as a “moral agent”. The 
acts in the second category, “civil disobedience,” are motivated not by the agent’s moral 
integrity, but by bringing about a change in law, policy or institution. McCloskey also 
stresses nonviolence in civil disobedience, paying respect to the constitution, and 
accepting the punishment; the contrary, he argued, would be “revolutionary 
disobedience.”40 In Rawls’ terminology the agent of revolutionary disobedience is “the 
militant” who rejects the given system as being unjust or unreasonable. S/he does not 
hold fidelity to the law; on the contrary, looks for acts of disruption and resistance 
where direct action could be taken.
41
 McCloskey also points to the trend that a lot of 
conscientious objection acts are taking the form of civil disobedience; not much is left 
of the objection that is limited down to individual moral values.
42
  
 
 
1.4. Conscientious Objection to Military Service 
 
Conscientious objection in the West has developed from Christian pacifism, 
which condemns killing under any circumstance and designates it evil. Of the other two 
Abrahamic religions, Islam does not have a pacifist tradition, neither does Judaism, 
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despite the commandment “thou shall not kill!” Some Eastern religions, such as 
Buddhism also have pacifist elements.  
The roots of Christian pacifism lead to a sermon that Jesus of Nazareth had 
given on nonviolence. His followers had become the earlier objectors, the first among 
whom known being Maximilian. A 21 year-old from the Numidia region in North 
Africa, who, as the son of a soldier of the Roman army, was called for the military, 
refused to perform military service, and was eventually executed in 295AD.
43
 Moskos 
and Chambers categorize the history of conscientious objection since Maximilian in 
four stages.
44
 
The first was a proto stage, as we can neither speak of a modern state 
establishment, nor universal conscription. The just war concept accepted by the Roman 
army in the 5
th
 century remained a significant element of war-making, as well as an 
issue which the Protestant Reformation contested. The Anabaptist churches referred to 
themselves as “defenseless Christians” and laid the foundations of conscientious 
objection. Through the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century Western world, conscientious objection 
was in a limbo state where it was left to the arbitrary decision of the state whether to 
exempt an individual, to have the objector benefit from exemption by payment, or to 
have the objector face severe punishment. Examples include the Brethen who had 
refused to pay war taxes and making weapons, and the Mennonites, to whom William 
of Orange granted formal exemption from military service in exchange for payment.
45
 
The second stage covered the early-modern society in which the objector status 
was granted only to the historic peace faiths that came out after the Protestant 
Reformation. The introduction of compulsory military service with Napoleon had 
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brought new dynamics and broke the Mennonite peace. This era has also witnessed the 
travel of these Protestant communities to the United States where they came to be 
known as “nonresistants”—those who do not resist evil with force—and had their 
objection recognized.  In the 20
th
 century Jehovah’s Witnesses 46  and Seventh Day 
Adventists
47
 were also granted objector status. The objectors at this stage were still 
required to serve in the military, though in non-combatant capacity. The concessions 
that the states made in this era to the religiously motivated objectors continued in the 
later centuries. 
Those in Europe had gone through a harder experience. The term “conscientious 
objector” was used in the 1890s for those who opposed compulsory vaccination. 
However, as the mass conscripts and reserve armies of Prussia had begun to be copied 
in other major European powers, by World War I the term shortly became equal to 
conscripts who refused to bear arms.  In 1916, Britain became the first state to adopt 
conscientious objection. While on the other hand, objectors were sent to mental 
institutions in Germany, and in France they were sentenced to prison up to 20 years.
48
  
Hence, early 20
th
 century Europe witnessed the transition to the third stage, 
which included the granting of objector status to all-religiously motivated individuals—
mediated by different Protestant churches and the Roman Catholic Church—as well as 
the implementation of alternative civilian service as opposed to the early modern era’s 
non-combatancy principle. Secular objection began to appear.  
In the midst of mass mobilization and nationalism of World War I years, 
objectors became a significant issue for the first time. Pressure from socialist groups 
such as the “Consistent Antimilitarists” as well as some religious groups have placed 
considerable pressure on the countries of northern Europe, as a result of which 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Netherlands recognized objection. In 1922, Norway 
became the first country to recognize non-religious objection based on conscientious 
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grounds. This was the first step towards the official secularization of conscientious 
objection.  
Also during World War I, middle class secular pacifist organizations began to 
appear, including the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, and the 
War Resister’s International. Antimilitarism also became a topic of discussion in Russia 
during the Civil War as well. Lenin and the Bolsheviks issued a directive for the 
recognition of conscientious objection and the practice of alternative service. Rosa 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were among those who wrote on the issue. The 
practice was eliminated with the Stalin government.  
During World War II years, Britain and the United States granted conscientious 
objection based on religious claims. In Germany objection was granted as a right only 
after joining NATO. By 1970, the United States began to recognize objections based on 
ethical or moral grounds as well.  
The fourth and present stage has included a major shift in the way conscientious 
objection has been framed. Secular objection has become widespread. Numerous human 
rights and antimilitarist groups have begun to take part in the establishment, making the 
subject even more confrontational, for the idea itself has begun to target the destruction 
of the military machinery. The advocacy of selective opposition to particular wars has 
begun to cause extraordinary numbers of active-duty military personnel to declare 
conscientious objection.  
Today, the types of conscientious objections from the objectors’ perspective can 
be categorized in three groups: (i) Depending on their motivation: religious, such as 
Quakers and Jehovah's Witnesses; or secular, based on political or personal moral 
stance. (ii) Depending on the scope of wars they oppose: while most conscientious 
objectors oppose all wars, there also are particularists: those who oppose only particular 
conflicts; those who do not oppose wars but choose not to participate in wars; those who 
oppose not wars but operations including the usage of particular weapons such as 
weapons of mass destruction. (iii) Depending on their willingness to participate with the 
state: the noncombatant, those who are willing to serve in the military but refuse to bear 
arms; the alternativists, those who acknowledge their duty to the state but prefer to 
participate in civilian service; and the absolutists, a.k.a. the total objectors, who oppose 
19 
 
to cooperate with the state in any way, for they oppose the authority of the state as a 
whole.
49
 
 
 
1.5. Conscientious Objection and Anti-Militarism 
 
Margaret Levi argues that whether it is executed by an individual or a group of 
citizens, “noncompliance is an attack on a policy” for it raises the costs of its 
implementation. Theorizing the political underpinnings of this noncompliance, she 
offers the term “contingent consent,” explained as “a citizen’s decision to comply or 
volunteer in response to demands from a government.”50 The extent to which a citizen 
perceives government trustworthy and is satisfied are other citizens willing to comply 
with state policy. Thus, even when we take an act of conscientious objection performed 
by one individual on the basis of moral justification, the act has an impact on the 
willingness of other citizens’ willingness to comply with the law, which ultimately 
hampers the government’s ability to achieve contingent consent.  
When the arguments presented in the previous sections are put into perspective 
using Levi’s definition, the picture acquired is as follows. The consent given to the 
modern state for protection does not only deliver the protection of the citizen, but also 
the protection of the status quo. For states that do not have the necessary means to fund 
a standing army via taxes, and for the states that use army as an institution through 
which a national identity can be built, conscription becomes a vital practice to maintain 
the army, who in return will help the state maintain the status quo. Whether it is 
classical authoritarian or modern civil society militarism, all militarist structures take 
their strength from a civic republican conception of citizenship where society is held 
responsible to the state with duties both enforced and performed with and through the 
body of the society, thus maintaining militarism both as a practice and as an attitude of 
mind.  
Conscientious objection of individuals who live in their country of citizenship 
where conscientious objection is recognized as a right can be considered as 
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complaints—since they conform to the law, or make use of a right granted by law, they 
can be considered conformists.
51
 Under conditions to the contrary, i.e., when this right 
is not recognized, conscientious objection will become an act of civil disobedience 
against a practice that is by nature the symbol of militarism.  
 
 
1.6.Conscientious Objection in Europe 
 
The term was adopted with the first draft in Great Britain in 1916, thus making 
UK the first European country to grant official recognition to conscientious objection. 
Several countries began allowing conscientious objection after UK, but the issue found 
its place in the agendas of international organizations only as late as the 1960s.
52
 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe was the first international 
institution to openly recognize conscientious objection.
53
 In its 1967 Resolution, the 
Assembly has openly defined the right to conscientious objection within the scope of 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights that describes freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion.
54
 In 1977, the Assembly took up the duty to “promote 
legal status for conscientious objectors in Council of Europe,” and recommended the 
Committee of Ministers to introduce the right to conscientious objection to military 
service into the European Convention on Human Rights.
55
 
                                                          
51
 See Nilgün Toker’s distinction between conscientious objection and antimilitarism. 
Nilgün Toker, “Vicdani Ret, Sivil İtaatsizlik ve Antimilitarizm: İtaat Etmeme ve 
Direnme,” in Çarklardaki Kum Vicdani Red, Düşünsel Kaynaklar ve Deneyimler, eds. 
Özgür Heval Çınar and Coşkun Üsterci (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008). 
52
 For a detailed discussion on conscientious objection and law, see Michael F. Noone, 
“Legal Aspects of Conscientious Objection: a Comparative Analysis,” in The New 
Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance, edited by Charles 
Moskos and John Whiteclay Chambers II (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
53
 Marcus, Emily N., “Conscientious Objection as an Emerging Human Right”, Virginia 
Journal Of International Law 38 (1998), 527-531.   
54
 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Resolution 337 on the Right of 
Conscientious Objection” (1967) available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Other_Committees/DH-DEV-
FA_docs/AP_Res_337_1967_en.pdf 
55
 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Recommendation 816 on the 
Right of Conscientious Objection to Military Service” (1977), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta77/EREC816.htm. 
21 
 
The first European document to explicitly recognize conscientious objection has 
been the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in 2000. In its article 
10 on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the Charter recognizes the "right to 
conscientious objection" "in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise 
of this right."
56
 A less explicit reference to this right is granted in the Recommendation 
No. R (87) 8 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states: 
"Anyone liable to conscription for military service who, for compelling reasons of 
conscience, refuses to be involved in the use of arms, shall have the right to be released 
from the obligation to perform such service."
57
 
Although conscientious objection is not pronounced, Articles 3 (granting the 
right to life, liberty and security of person) and 18 (the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights are 
interpreted to cover this right. In its comment on Article 18 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which grants the right of freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, the United Nations Human Rights Committee refers to 
conscientious objection as a right, for "the obligation to use lethal force may seriously 
conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one's religion or 
belief"
58
. Additionally, Article 4 of the Covenant guarantees that "no derogation from 
articl[e] ... 18 may be made" even "in time of public emergency which threatens the life 
of the nation."
59
  
The practices of states regarding conscientious objection can be categorized in 
four groups: those who do not have conscription (28 out of 47 in the Council of 
Europe), those who maintain conscription with the option of alternative civilian service 
(13 states, all of whom except Denmark and Estonia are of discriminatory or punitive 
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nature), those who have voluntary recruitment under the age 18 (15 states), to give some 
examples. In Germany, the right to conscientious objection is protected under the 
constitution, stating that "nobody may be forced against their conscience into military 
service involving armed combat"; there is no conscription in Belgium and Netherlands 
where it was abolished in 1995 and 1996, respectively; as the first continental European 
country to recognize the right of conscientious objection in 1917, Denmark carries its 
legacy by keeping the duration of military and civilian service equal (for 9 months), 
whereas in Latvia the contrast is twofold (12-month military vs. 24-month civilian 
service) and in Greece almost threefold (12-month military vs. 30-month civilian 
service). Despite this positive picture in Europe, only a limited number of states accept 
conscientious objection during war time.
 60
 Today, out of the 15 countries in the Council 
of Europe who practice conscription, Turkey remains to be the only one not to 
recognize the right to conscientious objection.
61
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CHAPTER 2 
TURKISH MILITARISM 
 
 
In the first chapter militarism was defined as an ideology advocating the 
expansion of the military over the civilian, and militarization as the process through 
which the society organizes itself around military interests, values and structure. Alfred 
Vagts was quoted to define the military as the ultimate beneficiary of militarism, and 
Michael Mann was quoted to point to the social goals in practice of militarization. This 
chapter will attempt to point at the implications of these concerns for Turkey by 
analyzing how militarism has penetrated Turkish politics and society. In the first section 
of the chapter, the authorities of the Turkish Armed Forces will be examined politically, 
judicially, and economically, to answer whether the power of military in the given 
system secures its position as the ultimate beneficiary. In the second section, the role of 
the military in the social realm will be examined by analyzing the Turkish state-making 
process and the weight that military carries in Turkish culture. 
 
 
2.1. Rise of the Autonomy of the Turkish Armed Forces 
 
2.1.1. Turkish Politics: A War Model in Times of Peace  
 
David Pion-Berlin defines military autonomy as “an institution’s decision-
making authority,” and analyzes this autonomy in two dimensions. The first dimension, 
institutional autonomy, refers to the military’s professional independence and 
exclusivity; the military retains a “sense of organic unity and consciousness” via 
rigorous training, hierarchy and rules of conduct, and using autonomy as a “defensive 
weapon,” draws up nonpermeable boundaries as an expression of its professionalism 
and authority in the area of management of violence. The second dimension, political 
autonomy, refers to the military’s “aversion” of civilian control; using autonomy as an 
24 
 
“offensive weapon,” the military acts “above and beyond” the constitutional authority 
of the government. “As the armed forces accumulate powers,” argues Pion-Berlin, “they 
become increasingly protective of their gains. The more valuable and entrenched their 
interests are, the more vigorously they will resist the transfer of control over those to 
democratic leaders.” Basing his arguments on the Latin American examples, Pion-
Berlin names this process as “a double movement of self-enforced isolation and 
enlargement of political influence;” as the military pushes its institutional boundaries, it 
also expands its limits of political influence, culminating in “the conquest of state 
power.”62  
The double movement described by Pion-Berlin, whereby the military’s self-
enforced isolation and enlargement of political influence to protect and widen its 
interests culminate in a conquest of power, finds it reflection in the Turkish case as well. 
Basing her arguments on Pion-Berlin’s analysis, Ümit Cizre argues that the civilian-
military relations in Turkey have followed a pattern which reinforced and maintained 
the independence of the armed forces, creating two “parallel state structures” the 
existence of which “undermines the authority and democratic accountability of elected 
civilian governments.”63  
Also using the same terminology, Ali Bayramoğlu defines the dynamics between 
the two as the continuum of the “war model” set out in the early 1920s. The major 
political aim of this model, he argues, is the control of state power; the model would be 
consolidated, legitimized, and legalized in the following periods, be them ordinary 
terms or states of emergency.
64
 By using this constitution-based analysis of 
Bayramoğlu, below I will try to portray how militarization has penetrated into or 
indirectly influenced the realm of legislation, judiciary and economy, yet at the same 
time shied away from taking up the executive power.  
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2.1.2. 1923-1946: Establishment of the War Model 
 
The model of interaction between the civil and military authorities as it was 
established in the war years consisted of two major elements: one was the Armed 
Forces’ zeal for autonomy within the state mechanism, and the other was the 
centralization efforts within the Armed Forces. In the 1920s, three institutional changes 
were made to achieve these two goals.
65
  
The first one was 1923 ordinance that replaced the Western, Eastern and 
Southern Front Commands with Inspectorships. Not only did the ordinance highly limit 
the authorities of the front commands; but by eliminating the commanding authorities of 
these posts, the ordinance discarded the graduated military hierarchy and created a 
highly centralized chain of command that bestowed all authorities to one single man. 
Maintained until as late as 1938, this centralized structure was an extension of the war-
time model where the head of the state was also the commander-in-chief. The 
continuation of this model was repeatedly a matter of concern both among the 
intellectuals, the ruling politicians and the military cadres as well.
66
 
The second was the 1924 law that reestablished the General Staff as the highest 
martial command independent from the Ministry of National Defense.
67
 The Chief of 
Staff was to be appointed by the offer of the Prime Minister and the approval of the 
President, without the intervention of the Ministry. The responsibility of the military 
budget was given to the Ministry. The 1924 Constitution had also annulled the 
President’s auditing authority over the General Staff. Thus, the General Staff had taken 
a position that is “above ministries” and “above politics,” as well as making the ministry 
a subordinate part of the military hierarchy. It had become a decision making authority 
without a higher institution to which it would be held accountable, whereas the Ministry 
of National Defense had become a state institution left merely with administrative 
duties yet carrying the weight of the decisions taken by the General Staff. This disparity 
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had laid the foundations of what Bayramoğlu calls the “authority-accountabilty 
defect.”68 
The third was the 1925 law on the Higher Military Council.
69
 By giving the 
council the authority to discuss and to decide upon (though in principle) all political, 
administrative, civil and martial issues pertaining to national defense, the law widened 
the military’s domain of influence and effectively made the Council a decisive organ in 
all aspects of society. The wide area of influence given to the council with the 1925 law 
was a consequence of internalizing the dominant concept of the Great War era, total 
mobilization, only this time in times of peace. Thus, the war-time dynamics of Turkish 
politics, with its highly-centralized military command, autonomous Chief of Staff 
superior to the Ministry of Defense, and the Higher Military Council that grants the 
military to extend its boundaries of influence, established the war-time model as the 
norm in Turkish politics.  
 
 
2.1.3. 1947-1979: Consolidation of the War Model 
 
The various economic and political changes after World War II have motivated 
the Armed Forces to plot coup d’etats, among which the 1960 attempt came through, 
along with amendments in the constitution and particular laws following a 
memorandum published in 1971. The coups were to consolidate its internal hierarchy by 
eliminating its potential internal rivals, and to restructure itself on a tripod of autonomy, 
i.e., legislation, judiciary, and economy. The positionality of the Armed Forces as an 
actor that has influential power in all these three areas, along with its guaranteed 
internal institutional hierarchy, have consolidated the autonomy element of the 1920s’ 
war model, and have extended the centralization element of the model to outside of the 
military sphere. The reforms made and the institutions established in this era have also 
created the body of military as a social class, the foundations of which were established 
in the 1920s. 
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Beginning with the institutional autonomy, following the coup of 1960, the first 
step of the military was to reestablish the former hierarchy of the military which was 
damaged during the early Cold War era. Truman Doctrine and the membership to 
NATO not only had canalized large funds to Turkey for modernizing and mechanizing 
the military, but had also caused a division within the military corps due to the 
differences in training and vision between the former generation of officers taught in the 
German school and the younger officers taught in the American. When the coup was 
executed in May 1960, the new generation had decided to dismiss their rival higher 
generals; in August 1960, 4171 officers including 235 out of 260 generals were 
pensioned off.
70
 Later on in 1961 the senior officers have also formed an Armed Forces 
Union so as to limit military intervention to the hierarchical principle.
71
  
The second step was on the political autonomy of the military, i.e., the position 
of the General Staff. In the post-war years the autonomy of the General Staff was 
shaken by making it accountable to the Prime Minister in 1944, and to the Ministry of 
National Defense in 1949. With the Article 110 of the 1961 Constitution,
72
 the General 
Staff was broken off from the Ministry and was once again held responsible to the 
Prime Minister, thus elevating the position of the General Staff back to the level 
“above-ministries.”  
The third step was also on political autonomy, i.e., the formation of the National 
Security Council as a constitutionally pronounced actor. The Council was established 
for the first time in 1933 with the name Supreme Defense Council, with the duty to 
designate the tasks related to “national mobilization.” Prior to the transition to the multi-
party system, a Supreme Council of National Defense was established in July 1949 as a 
third defense-related actor next to the General Staff and the Ministry of National 
Defense. Although the Council was lead by the Prime Minister, the duties of the 
Council indicated enforcement; the primary duty of the Council was defined as 
“designating the principles of the national defense policy to be implemented by the 
government.” With the 1961 Constitution, the council was yet again renamed, this time 
as the National Security Council. The renaming of the council was also symbolic as it 
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reflected a policy transition from “national defense” to “national security,” the latter 
denoting total mobilization. It had become not only an authority to “express” the “basic 
prospects” regarding matters of national security as is suggested in Article 111 of the 
Constitution, but also an authority that audits the Cabinet’s implementation of “national 
mobilization plans” during states of emergency. 73  With the 1971 amendments, the 
authority to express prospects was replaced with the authority to “recommend”.74 
These three steps guaranteed the position of the Armed Forces as an institution 
that is internally centralized, subject only to the two highest posts in the state structure, 
with the authority to intervene in and audit the activities of the cabinet. When the 
military junta took up the rule under the name National Unity Committee, it was the 
junta to refer to itself as an “above-party-administration;”75 in this parallel, the changing 
position of the General Staff and the National Security Council had constitutionalized 
the National Unity Committee under peace-time circumstances.  
Autonomy, however, would not be complete without an independent judiciary 
and financial resources of its own. During this era, four important steps were taken with 
regards to the judiciary. The first one was the establishment of military courts. With 
Article 138 of the 1961 Constitution and the 1963 Law on the Establishment and Trial 
Procedures of Military Courts, the judiciary power of the Republic was divided and 
turned into a double-headed structure. While the authority to establish military courts 
was given to the Ministry of National Defense, whether a military court was to be 
established at a particular location was to be decided by the General Staff.
 76
 Once again 
the Ministry was left with administrative duties whereas the General Staff was the 
decisive power.  
The second step regarding judiciary was the limitations brought to the auditing 
power of the state upon the Armed Forces. An additional clause added to Article 140 in 
1971 took the authority to audit proceedings on officers from the Council of State and 
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gave it to the Supreme Military Administrative Court, removing the civilian 
administrative authority on military administration. Yet with another an additional 
clause to the Article 127 in 1971, the authority of the Court of Accounts to audit the 
incomes from and expenses on the state-owned properties used by the military was 
lifted. Thus, with these two amendments in 1971, the authorities of civil courts were 
significantly limited, and the Armed Forces was emancipated from state auditing both in 
administrative and partially in financial matters.  
The third step involved martial law and trial of civilians in martial courts. 
According to the Article 138 of the 1961 Constitution, deserters or evaders who have 
never showed up for military inspection were to be tried in military courts as such 
actions were considered “treachery towards national defense.”77 The amendment on the 
law in 1971 further allowed civilians to be tried in military courts due to crimes 
committed against military personnel or on martial sites, regardless of the type of the 
crime. The amendment has also removed the time limitations to state of siege. Whereas 
the Article 123 of the 1961 constitution allowed only one month of state of siege which 
could be extended only for a second month, the 1971 amendment on the article set forth 
an initial two-month state of siege, which could be repeated by additional two-month 
terms without any definition of how many. Recognizing that in states of siege it is not 
the police force but the military that takes up the duty to internal security,
78
 the 
amendments in the legislation regarding states of siege reflect the military’s eagerness 
to claim control over administration as well.  
The fourth step regarding the judiciary came with another amendment in 1973, 
dividing the judiciary power yet another time, creating a three-headed judicial structure. 
The amendment to Article 136 had set forth the establishment of State Security Courts, 
which were by definition the embodiment of the national security policy. They were 
established so as to hear cases against “the unity of the state with its land and nation,” 
but the provisions for states of siege and war were reserved.  
Coming to economic autonomy, the two amendments regarding the auditing of 
the military made to the 1971 referred to above were significant steps in this matter. 
However, the foundations of the economic autonomy of the Armed Forces were laid 
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prior to these amendments, in 1961 with the Law on the Army Mutual Assistance 
Association. Despite the large sums of American aid funneled into the economy in 1948 
with the Marshall Plan and mechanization in agriculture crowned by the Korean boom, 
the ineffective investments of the early 1950s with their short-term goals created a 
sharply declining picture after a brief period of growth and left Turkey with high 
amounts of external debt and inflation.
79
 Among the major group of classes that were 
most severely hurt by the worsening conditions were the salaried workers, especially in 
this case, the officers. The officers were convinced that the government was unwilling 
to undertake military reforms or make adjustments to officers’ salaries both because the 
government viewed military spending as a secondary item compared to industrialization 
and because the Prime Minister felt secure from a military intervention with former 
generals in its cabinet.
80
  
As a consequence of these economic concerns of the army, a new social security 
institution, Army Mutual Assistance Association was established to ensure that the 
members of the armed forces would “break free from the distress of future” and 
“achieve material and moral peace.”81 Such remonstrances in the justification statement 
of the law, argues İsmet Akça, are the reflections of how the Armed Forces viewed 
itself as a privileged class.
82
 The association required all commissioned and non-
commissioned officers and officials to contribute to a fund that was to serve as their 
pension in the coming years. For this reason, the Army Mutual Assistance Association 
is an “additional” social security institution serving exclusively the Armed Forces. Also 
because of the compulsory contributions demanded especially from the non-
commissioned officers who do not receive a service in return, Akça refers to the 
institution as a “compulsory savings association.”83  
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Although the association was established as a social security institution on the 
surface, Article 33 of the law on the association allowed it to establish companies, to 
build residences, and found private schools, and Article 35 held all these ventures 
exempt from five different types of taxes, including corporate income tax, inheritance 
tax, and revenue tax.
84
 Hence, large sums of capital collected from the members, and 
this capital was used in various sectors, including real estate, banking, insurance, as well 
as joint ventures in the automobile industry, petroleum products, and cement. By 1969, 
the equities of the association have increased by 2400 per cent,
85
 i.e., a rise from 0 to 
almost 100 million USD.
86
 Supported by 60 companies,
87
 and with 260,000 members, 
today the fund bears the title “biggest privately owned pension fund.”88  
In explaining the power elite of the United States, Wright Mills draws a “triangle 
of power,” uniting economy, political order and military. The unity of these three, he 
argues, can be understood by paying attention to three elements: psychological 
similarity and social mingling; structural blending of commanding positions and 
common interests; and explicit coordination.
89
 With its influential power on politics via 
the directing and auditing authorities of the General Staff and National Security 
Council, and with its economic ventures with big civilian firms as well as independent 
investments that are neither administrated nor audited by the state, the Turkish Armed 
Forces stands as the ultimate embodiment of Mills’ power elite where the three unites as 
one.  
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2.1.4. 1980-2001: Ossification of the War Model  
 
The 1980 coup and the following two years during which all political parties 
were closed
90
 and the junta led the state have provided the Armed Forces with the 
opportunity to further strengthen its position to the extent of immunization from all civil 
attempts for control, may them be administrative, judicial or financial. 
In the political realm, the influential power of the National Security Council was 
increased. With Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution,
91
 the number of military personnel 
in the council was increased, the authority to decide on the agenda for the council 
meetings was granted to the Chief of General Staff in addition to the Prime Minister 
who formerly was the only authority in this regard, and decisions taken at the meetings 
became a priority for the Cabinet. Thus, after constitutionalizing its influential power on 
policy making in 1961, with the new constitution the Armed Forces has elevated its 
position as a decisive power. 
The decisive power of the Council was embodied in three documents: a 
“National Security Policy Document” updated every five years; a “National Strategy 
Document” that reconstructed the points of implementation made out from the Policy 
Document; and the “National Martial Strategic Concept” where the threat assessments 
were compiled. The weight of the National Security Policy Document gained itself the 
colloquial reference as the “red book” or the “secret constitution of the state;” it was the 
former Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş himself who referred to the National Security Policy 
as “the god of all policies, the constitution.” According to Güreş, under these 
circumstances the National Security Council decisions could not be regarded as simple 
advice.
92
   
A second step was on the limits of Armed Forces’ spending and financial 
auditing. The 1985 amendment in the Law on the Court of Accounts, military spending 
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and the related contracts were considered as exceptions to the areas that the Court of 
Accounts could audit.
93
 Also in 1985 a new Defense Industry Support Fund was 
established, which again was considered extra budgetary, i.e. out of the auditing domain 
of the Court of Accounts. In addition to freedom from auditing, the expenditures that 
were done through this fund were exempt from taxes.
94
 Thus, the 1971 attempts to 
emancipate the Armed Forces from state auditing were completed with these two laws. 
In addition to these regulations for the peace-time conditions, Article 122 of the 
Constitution amended the legislations regarding state of siege. The initial length of state 
of siege was increased to six months, with additional terms of four months. The same 
article held commanders of the state of siege responsible solely to the Chief of General 
Staff, and according to Annex Clause 3 of the Law on State of Siege, the penal 
liabilities of the commanders were repealed.
95
 Thus, the executive power had been 
incorporated into the military hierarchy, with no higher authority to audit. This power 
was also supported by State of Siege Courts.
96
 Beginning from September 1980, State 
of Siege has continued in all Turkey until July 1987.  
The third step was the consolidation of the idea of total mobilization not only in 
the state establishment, but also in the social realm. Article 13 of the 1982 Constitution 
provided the permission to limit the fundamental rights and freedoms of its citizens. 
Article 118 had redefined the role of the National Security Council as “ensuring the 
peace and security of the society”. The National Security Council utilized this indefinite 
domain by establishing various undersecretaries through which it penetrated society, 
such as the Directorate of Information Collection and Assessment, Directorate of Total 
Defense Civil Services, Counsellorship of Psychological Operation Training, 
Counsellorship of Visual and Audio-Visual Media, Counsellorship of Internet.
97
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Founding of the Higher Education Council with Article 131 eliminated the autonomy of 
the universities, and media was taken under control through the Radio and Television 
Supreme Council, founded according to Article 133. State Security Courts were also 
reestablished, and stayed in operation for two decades. Thus, while Article 13 of the 
constitution provided the permission to limit the fundamental rights and freedoms of its 
citizens, the various institutions of the National Security Council performed the 
monitoring and restriction, along with the State Security Courts as its jurisdictional 
force.  
Prior to the ultimatum of February 1997, in January, a directive on state of 
emergency was passed. Entitled the Directive on Department of Crisis, the directive set 
forth the proclamation of a new wide-ranging state of emergency, where the political 
authorities of the civilian members in the National Security Council would be repealed, 
and the Prime Minister would pass all its authorities to the Secretary General of the 
National Security Council.
 98
 The directive also eased the transition to martial law; 
according to crisis management regulations, transition to martial law did not require 
consulting the parliament. It defined social movements
99
 as excuses or reasons for 
implementing crisis management procedures; all public institutions and private legal 
entities were obliged to forward information and intelligence to the Crisis Management 
Office. This way, once the military assumed power, it would hold total control by 
utilizing not only the instruments of the state, but the citizens themselves. 
 
 
2.1.5. 2001-2012: Shattering the War Model 
 
The military regime as implemented until 2001 had two definitive elements: (i) 
institutional centralization of the military to extend into the realm of the state, i.e. an 
opposite hierarchical structure between the Cabinet and the General Staff; (ii) autonomy 
of the Armed Forces in administrative, judicial, and financial matters, i.e. emancipation 
of the Armed Forces from auditing.  
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From 2001 onwards, the civil-military relations in Turkish politics began to 
change in the opposite direction. The first step was taken in October 2001; 34 articles in 
the constitution were amended, one of which was article 118. The 2001 amendment has 
increased the number of civilian members in the National Security Council, creating a 
civilian majority. It also curbed the sanction power of the military by changing the 
statement that the Cabinet had to give priority to the NSC decisions, into that the 
Cabinet would “evaluate” the NSC decisions. The 2001 amendments can be considered 
symbolic in this regard since they did not interfere with the imbalance in the division of 
powers; still, they were significant as they marked the beginning of an era that was to 
reverse the habitual nature of civil-military relations so far.
100
  
Following the 2001 constitutional amendments, the enthusiasm of the Justice 
and Development Party for re-accelerating relations with the European Union highly 
contributed to the civilianization of Turkish politics. In 2003, the National Assembly 
passed the 7
th
 Reform Program that amended 11 articles in the Constitution.
101
 8
th
 
Clause on the political criteria of the program curbed the power of the National Security 
Council, and has opened the way to the financial auditing of military expenditures. The 
5
th
 clause was on reforming the judiciary, but the clause was limited only to the 
judiciary personnel on human rights. 
Based on the reform program, significant amendments were made on the Law on 
the National Security Council: Recruitment procedure of the Council Secretary General 
was amended; from then on, civilians were also given the right to be appointed as the 
Council Secretary General, and when appointed they were subject to the law on civil 
servants. The authority to appoint the secretary general was taken from the Chief of 
Staff and given to the Prime Minister. The vast authorities of the Council Secretary 
General were also curbed; such as being authorized by the President and the Prime 
Minister for planning, following up and auditing of national security policy, as well as 
having access to all types of classified intelligence or document. The frequency of 
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Council meetings was decreased from once each month to once in two months. The 
active duties of the NSC, such as preparing national action plans and following them up, 
were repealed. The obligation of all public institutions and private legal entities to 
forward all open or classified information to the Council was annulled. Eventually, the 
Council was left as an institution that only takes “advisory decisions.”102 
Regarding matters of auditability, with the 2004 amendment of Article 160 of 
the Constitution, the exemption of state properties held by the Armed Forces from 
auditing by the Court of Accounts was annulled. This annulling was an extension of the 
7
th
 Harmonization Package which opened the way to the auditing of all types of 
foundations and organizations that benefit from public resources, which also covered 
the Defense Industry Support Fund as well as the Mehmetçik Foundation. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the amendment opened the way for auditing does not deliver a regular and 
systematic auditing of such expenditures and funds; according to the amendment, 
auditing could be done “upon the request of” the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 
Authorities of the military courts vis-à-vis the civilians were also amended with 
the 7
th
 Harmonization Package. Articles in the Military Penal Code and the Turkish 
Penal Code that consider acts as “encouraging military personnel to revolt and 
disobedience,” “alienating public from military service,” and “damaging national 
strength” were amended so that those individuals who commit these crimes could not be 
tried at military courts.
103
 Finally, with an amendment on the Law on Military Courts in 
2006 has brought the trial of civilians at military courts in peace-time consequences to 
an end; nevertheless, though they were to be heard in civilian courts, the trial was to be 
based on Military Penal Law.
104
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2.2. Consolidation of a Militarized Culture 
 
2.2.1. Militarization as Nation Building 
 
Hans Kohn, in his 1944 book, classified nationalisms in two categories as 
Western and non-Western nationalisms. The Western type was characterized by 
individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism without much attachment to the past; 
whereas non-Western nationalism was developed through a “backward state of political 
and social development” in organic, mystical, authoritarian forms. French, British and 
American nationalisms were the examples he provided for the Western conception of 
nationalism; the non-Western nationalism was associated more with Central and Eastern 
Europe and Russia, with German nationalism as the specific example.
105
 
In his 1990 article, at a time when old conceptions of nationalism and citizenship 
were being challenged, Rogers Brubaker also presented a categorization of nationalisms 
comparing France and Germany. He argued that the nation-state was “a figment of the 
sociological imagination.”106 Nation-states, as he described, carried the marks of the 
particular historical circumstances under which these states were established. 
Comparing the two different historical trajectories of state making and nation building 
in France and Germany, he introduced two types of nationalisms: “state-led” and “state-
seeking nationalisms.” In the case of France, the nation was defined in relation to the 
state institutionally and territorially. What constituted the nation was not shared culture, 
but political unity. Culture was built synthetically through the assimilationist practices 
via schools, army and the centralized administration; hence Brubaker’s definition of the 
French conception of citizenship as “universalist, rationalist, assimilationist and state-
centered.” He contrasted the French case to the German case. He argued that unlike 
France where cultural unity was built after the state, in Germany national feeling had 
developed prior to the nation-state. He described the pre-state German community as 
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“an organic, cultural, linguistic or racial community” “in search of a state” and the state 
they built became “particularistic, organic, differentialist and volk-centered.”107 
Interpreting the implications of these two analyses for Turkey, Ayşe Kadıoğlu 
likens the Turkish case to a Janus with two faces that carries the elements of both 
French and German nationalisms, therefore embracing both civilization and culture.
108
 
On one hand, she refers to Ahmet Yıldız who emphasizes the dominance of the ethno-
cultural elements in the first two decades of the republic—an organic and ethnic type of 
nationalism closer to German nationalism. On the other hand, she defines state political 
unity in Turkey “as the constitutive unit of the Turkish nation-state.”109 The republic 
was founded upon “principles that were not genuine but were rather manufactured from 
above.” In the historical sequence of state-making and nation-building, she argues, 
Turkish state preceded the nation, hence making Turkey “a state in search of its nation.” 
The new state challenged the monarchical, religious, decentralized state along 
with its war-oriented and widely agricultural economy, and replaced it with a 
centralized parliamentary democracy based on secular and rationalist principles along 
with the goal of mechanization of military and industrialization of the economy. The 
incompatibility of the new republic with the existing society had created various 
opposition movements from groups of differing motivations, including advocacy of the 
Caliphate and the Sultanate, or liberation movements of ethnic minorities, all of which 
were suppressed by military means, along with laws that grant the government with 
extraordinary powers to establish repose.  
Building of an ideology was viewed as a potential weaver for the society and for 
overcoming the opposition. Hence, the six principles of the founding party—
republicanism, reformism, nationalism, populism, statism and secularism—were 
promoted and taught as the state ideology. Efforts were also made to reframe Turkish 
superiority among all nations by studies in history, language and eugenics. Kadıoğlu 
finds these attempts neither successful, nor democratic as the state claimed itself to be.  
“The Republican elites' attempts to create an ideology were only skin-
deep and not espoused by all the classes. The Republic was founded upon 
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principles that were not genuine but were rather manufactured from 
above. In short, the Republic was not democratic. Democracy was not 
one of the six arrows of the Republican People’s Party.”110 
 
Kadıoğlu also argues that the elite’s effort to preserve the organic distinctiveness 
of the society while at the same time transforming this society into a nation was 
“paradoxical” within itself. 111  
Despite its contradictions, establishing and maintaining an official identity in 
Turkey, then, was the goal of Turkish militarism. 
 
 
2.2.2. Military as a Cultural Artifact and its Relevance Today 
 
In Chapter 1.2.1., in an effort to show the connection between state making and 
conscription, the aversion towards armies in the 19
th
 century was emphasized, and the 
role of nationalism was defined as the cultural artifact that normalized militarism. 
Taking the topic up from where Anderson and Enloe left off, Ayşe Gül Altınay points to 
the culturalization of military service. The citizen as created by the military during the 
military service, in turn embraces the military service as well as the values and 
hierarchy of the military as part of its culture. 
Quoting to Mevlut Bozdemir, Altınay underlines the “educating” feature of the 
military service, where the military contributes to “the making of a ‘national citizen’ 
with a national language, culture, and set of goals.” 112  Her research pictures an 
environment where Turkish is taught and used as the only language, non-Muslims are 
discriminated against by having them forcibly wear marks on their nametags, soldiers 
working in the kitchen are addressed with women’s names, homosexuals are considered 
“psychologically impaired” and the gun and the country are entrusted to the soldiers as 
their chastity, all of which creates a hierarchy where the Turkish-speaking, Muslim 
heterosexual males entertain the status of the sole accepted breed, whereas all else are 
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treated as potential threats except the women who, along with the country, are to be kept 
pure and untouched.  
The implications of the military mindset in daily life, as Altınay explains, are 
embodied in the military postures and marches taught at the physical education classes, 
the military-style celebration of children’s day and youth day celebrations, naming of 
universities with dates of battles, the multiplicity of the statues and monuments being 
related to military events or personalities.
113
 These implications constitute the efforts to 
realize the military-nation ideology. 
The internalization of the military service as a cultural artifact, can be identified 
by looking at the acknowledgement of this service not only as a service required for 
being a citizen, but also for being able to continue a life as part of the social 
environment. Motivations of soldiers for serving in the army, documented in works of 
Altınay as well as Pınar Selek, Nadire Mater, and Mehmet Ali Birand, show how 
military service has become a must in social life such as being accepted by your family 
or social environment, getting a job, getting married, as well as not being alienated from 
the “men’s talk” centered around military service.114  
Finally, the question remains as to why militarization is not yet outdated. It has 
two reasons. The first is the ongoing war between the Kurdish forces and the Turkish 
military, where the unitary state principle had posed a problem since the establishment 
of the republic. The constant closures of Kurdish parties in the past 30 years elevated 
the issue to armed struggle. The tens of thousands of deaths during the process have 
provided the Turkish side with further excuses for agitating antagonism and maintaining 
its stance and public support. 
The second is the competent nature of Turkish politics where parties as well as 
their social base struggle to move from the center to the periphery in a tug of war, and 
when they do claim the center they tend to act in a revanchist manner.
115
 Thus even 
though the replacing cadres may not implement armed oppression of an opposition, 
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inclination to suppression is maintained. The various reforms made in the past ten years 
by the current government to civilianize politics as explained earlier in this chapter had 
created the image of revenge
116
 of the Islamist cadres against the secular military, by 
whom the Islamists were interpreted as a threat. The recent series of cases about the 
plotting of military coups against the given government during which numerous high 
level officers had been arrested created the sense of retaliation. The increasing emphasis 
in the police force
117
 and intelligence agencies
118
 along with the increasing human rights 
violations
119
 created the sense of emerging authoritarianism
120
 to replace military 
dominance—replacement of military suit, hierarchy and values with those of the 
replacing stratum. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN TURKEY 
 
 
This chapter will focus on when the term “conscientious objection” has appeared 
in Turkey; reactions of the public and the state to the idea; whether the idea was able to 
create a base of social support; whether it has become a movement; divisions among the 
objectors; interaction and cooperation between conscientious objectors, other NGOs and 
political parties; the legal implications of the term, and future prospects for the 
objectors. 
 
 
3.1. Emergence of the Conscientious Objection Movement in Turkey 
 
In an effort to establish the connection between militarism and conscientious 
objection, the first chapter presented various types of objections. At the most basic 
level, conscientious objection was defined as the rejection to some type of compulsory 
service in the military – the conditions of this service varied. Based on this generalized 
definition, the concept can easily be stripped off its political connotations, allowing 
even draft evaders to be referred to as conscientious objectors—hence the choice of the 
term “concept” instead of “act”. 
Using this terminology, the earliest conscientious objectors in the history of 
Turkey would be considered the draft evaders in the 18
th
 century Ottoman Empire. The 
draft – not yet compulsory military service by then – was introduced as a step towards 
centralization within the modernization project of the Ottoman State. In this regard, the 
military service had easily become the state’s major medium of control over its citizens. 
Although the number of draft evaders has sharply decreased in the republican era, 
evasion never totally ceased.  
Objection to military service based on political justifications, on the other hand, 
began in the late 20
th
 century. Beginning with the anarchists, men and women who are 
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Christians, Muslisms, and Kurds declared their objections to military service. Although 
their number have never raised higher than a few hundred, the movement, considered 
along with the widening circle of supporters, increasing media coverage, and hundreds 
of thousands of draft evaders, can be seen as a minor movement or one that carries the 
potential to become a social movement.  
However, due to the militarist nature of Turkish politics and culture, their 
objections have gained them a radical position against the system, as a result of which 
they had to face heavy pecuniary and intangible burdens. Although some of these 
objectors managed to carry the violations of rights originating from conscientious 
objection to international courts, the implications of these cases had not been strong 
enough to cause a change in the circumstances of the objectors.  
In this framework, this first section will present the history of conscientious 
objection in Turkey from the Ottoman Empire until now.  
 
 
3.1.1. Earlier Objectors: Draft Evaders  
 
The first step in the Ottoman Empire towards creating a European style army 
was taken in 1792 with the establishment of the New Army by Selim III. While this 
army was not comprised of conscripts, it was a professional establishment that increased 
its size from 1500 up to 27,000 in ten years. In 1826, Mahmud II had taken up 
reformation in military and took the radical step of closing down the Janissary army, 
which had become a threat to the political authority. Instead, he established a 
professional army of 27000, consisting of conscripts and volunteers, who were required 
to serve 12 years.
121
  
Conscription became the subject of discussion with the establishment of a 
reserve army based on the Prussian model in 1834. The arbitrary forms of recruitment 
were partially brought to an end with the Imperial Edict of 1839. But the first time that 
conscription was set out in detail came in 1848. This was a conscription based on 
drawing lots, where non-Muslims were exempt from service, also exempt were Muslims 
who paid particular higher taxes. Despite the irregularities of the practice of 
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conscription, the 1848 law brought the army to a total of 150,000 soldiers, recruiting 
30,000 men each year. The Edict of 1856 brought conscription to non-Muslims as well, 
which meant further exemption taxes for the military, rather than additional men.
122
 
After the Edict of 1856, the law was reissued twice in 1871 and 1914. Both of 
them included detailed legislation on recruitment as well as penalties for evaders. Either 
way, the lack of a well established system of census limited the implementation of these 
laws. The severity of the problem became clear during World War I when the number 
of draft evaders had reached 300,000, i.e. about 20% of the population, whereas this rate 
was never higher than 2% in the European armies.
123
  
The motivations for these evaders however, were far from the civil disobedience 
discussed in Chapter 1. The economic conditions of the collapsing empire had left its 
army poorly dressed and poorly fed. The consecutive wars had tired not only the 
soldiers but also their families that deserters were able to find hospitality among local 
population. Even during the War of Independence, when martial courts had been 
sentencing deserters with death, about 10% of the army had been reported to be 
missing.
124
 
Situation had changed with the centralization efforts and modernized systems of 
census in the modern republic. In addition to the practice of compulsory military service 
from 1927 onwards, military was promoted with reference to national sentiment. 
National armies were portrayed as the savior and protector of national sovereignty, 
military service was defined as the most sacred duty as well as a characteristic of the 
Turkish nation.
125
 Still, today the total number of draft evaders, deserters and deferred 
stand around 1 million.
126
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3.1.2. Objection with a Political Agenda: the War Resisters’ Association 
 
The seeds of the conscientious objection movement in Turkey were sown with 
Tayfun Gönül and Vedat Zencir's declaration of conscientious objection in February 
1990 via the weekly Sokak and the daily Güneş.  
In his statement of objection, Zencir emphasized his determination to live a life 
that is absolutely free from any chain of command, in line with the particular moral 
principles and world-view to which they adhere. Recognizing human life to be sacred, 
he declared his objection to participate in any structure or institution oriented at killing, 
including the military which “gave him cramps in the stomach.”127  
Unlike Zencir who centered his declaration around personal reasons, Gönül had 
a more political stance. In his manifesto entitled “No to Compulsory Military Service,” 
he has defined military and militarism as the two biggest taboos to be shattered on the 
path to freedom. As he saw it, militarism was a sickness that legitimized and affirmed 
tyranny and systematic violence, and military was the organization oriented around 
these aims. It was responsible for guarding the status quo, i.e., all types of power 
relations within a society. In parallel, as an institution of education, it established these 
power relations primarily within its own structure by de-personalizing and numbing its 
members, teaching absolute obedience, hatred for the different, and killing of an enemy 
as defined by an authority. Within a system where there was freedom of conscience, no 
one could have been forced to serve in the military.
 128
  
 Following these interviews, two court cases were opened on these individuals. 
Based on Article 155 of the Turkish Penal Code, Gönül and Zencir were accused of 
“alienating the public from military service.”129 Despite having tried at a State Security 
Court, Zencir was acquitted and Gönül was sentenced to three months of imprisonment, 
which was turned into punitive fine.
130
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The timing of Gönül and Zencir’s declarations were significant due to the 
escalation of the civil war between the Turkish state and the Kurdish separatist 
movement. Since its launch in 1984 until 1990, over 2500 had died in the clashes; by 
1994 it had reached 7000.
131
 In April 1991 the government passed the Anti-Terrorism 
Law
132
 that annulled laws such as the 1983 Law on Publications in Languages Other 
than Turkish and the 1963 Law on Freedom of Assembly and Demonstrations, and 
provided the state a blurry definition of terrorism that granted them “extraordinary 
powers to deal with whatever they choose to designate as terrorism.” Furthermore, the 
Gulf War that erupted in August 1990 during which Turkey sided with the United States 
by shutting down its Kirkuk pipeline, effectively causing the creation of a de facto front 
in Turkey’s southeast. 133   
In this environment, in İzmir, Antalya, Ankara and Istanbul there were a few 
activist groups that were organizing around anti-militarist ideas. One of these activist 
groups was Amargi,
 134
 an anarchist group that put heavy weight in anti-militarism. One 
of the three pieces in the first issue of their magazine was written by the first 
conscientious objector Vedat Zencir, and was about the experiences of a man who was 
about to be called for the military. The second issue of the magazine was completely 
devoted to antimilitarism.
135
 During a networking meeting between these anarchist 
groups in the summer of 1992 in Dikili, Amargi came up with the proposal to establish 
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an organization with a focus on conscientious objection, and to organize the annual 
international conscientious objectors’ meeting in Turkey the following year.136 
In December 1992, they established the War Resisters' Association in Izmir. If 
the trials of Gönül and Zencir were the first appearance of conscientious objection in 
public sphere, the War Resisters’ Association was the first attempt to institutionalize 
conscientious objection as a movement. The aim of the association was defined in the 
program as  
“to struggle against war, militarism, and racism; to unite the people who 
are concerned on this subject, to mediate solidarity among them, to be the 
hub of common struggle; and to contribute to the creation of a culture that 
favors peace and freedom instead of the dominant racist and militarist 
culture.”137  
 
Although the association would be closed and re-opened in the following years 
in different provinces, their aims and actions have remained in line with the first 
establishment. 
The association was coming from an anarchist tradition, and therefore had a non-
hierarchical structure that did not have a directing body. Official paperwork and 
correspondence was followed through by a central secretariat. The association had a 
democratic structure with a rotating executive council and without a chair. The activities 
were taken up by work-groups focusing on various issues including publishing and 
media, conscientious objection, Kurdish issue, and the planned international 
conference.
138
 The activities of these groups that are significant for our purposes can be 
categorized in three areas of focus: spreading conscientious objection and making it 
visible; non-militant and non-violent activism primarily for ending the civil war in 
Turkey as well as other wars outside of Turkey’s borders; establishing cooperation 
between other NGOs for activism for these two aims.  
Although short-lived, the association was able to make an impression and ignite 
the spark of a nation-wide conscientious objection campaign. The first act came in 
January 1993; six members of the association made a joint declaration of conscientious 
objection during a public event, which constituted the first among the many planned 
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“waves of objection declarations”. Unlike the declarations in 1990, this joint declaration 
was ignored by the state.
139
  
A second act was the organization of the first international conscientious 
objectors meeting in July 1993, in İzmir. With this meeting, cooperation and dialogue 
with War Resisters’ International was made. Established in 1981 and based in Spain, 
War Resisters’ International had constituted the only international platform for global 
activism on and political strategizing of conscientious objection. The meeting brought 
together 90 individuals from 19 countries. It also was the first time when this annual 
meeting was held out of Europe.
140
  
International cooperation was not limited to the conference in Turkey. In 1994, 
İzmir War Resisters’ Association led by Osman Murat Ülke had attended meetings in 
Germany organized by Greenpeace, where they were given nonviolence training. The 
training was adapted for the Turkish objectors and is being given since then.
141
 They 
had also attended a meeting of international conscientious objectors in Colombia, and a 
meeting of anti-war campaigners in Brazil. In 1996, these members received criminal 
convictions based on the 1983 Act that required associations travelling abroad to obtain 
permission from the Ministry of Interior. The prison sentences that the members 
received were turned into fines. However, when the European Court of Human Rights 
had evaluated the case, it unanimously found Turkey in violation of Article 11 of the 
Convention, i.e., freedom of association.
142
 In its March 2006 judgment, the Court noted 
that the peaceful intentions of the given individuals were “beyond dispute,” and the 
conviction “was problematic in an interdependent world in which associations’ 
activities were interlinked and had international ramifications.”143 Despite the reputation 
of the Court, the case did not find much coverage in the media. 
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The third act aimed at creating an anti-militarist platform focusing on the 
Kurdish issue that would cooperate with other NGOs for working on a call for peace 
centralized around the motto “Neither the military, nor the mountain!” It was named the 
Peace Platform, and consisted of 25 individuals representing 13 organizations, including 
the Human Rights Association and Confederation of Public Laborers’ Unions. The 
platform first began by attending the Newroz
144
 celebrations in the eastern provinces of 
Van, Diyarbakır and Mardin in 1993, and visited the governors’ offices in these cities. 
On September 1 Day of Peace, they have initiated a petition campaign in İzmir for 
ending the civil war, as part of which they have collected about 7000 signatures within a 
week’s time.145  
Their acts were not limited to Turkish politics, and have also experimented with 
different methods of activism. In August 1993, on the anniversary of the bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they have held street demonstrations, performed street theater, 
and stopped people to hand them provocative pieces of writing that said “You are 
responsible!”146  
The declarations, when followed by the international meeting, drew public 
attention the concept; the association was asked to remove the anti-militarism statement 
from their program, on grounds that there was no militaristic structure in Turkey. In 
November 1993, at a time when the counter-PKK policy and “special operations”147 
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were at its highest,
148
 the governor’s office commanded the closure of the association.149 
The closure of the association was significant in reflecting the antimilitarist agenda of 
the movement; unlike their name which only reflects the anti-war or pacifist feature of 
the association, the anti-militarist statement in their agenda had itched the sensitivities 
of the state. 
The event that drew the biggest attention to the organization, however, was the 
interview with Aytek Özel and Menderes Meletli at the program named “Anten,” 
broadcasted on the nation-wide TV channel HBB. Following the broadcast, the 
producer of the program, the cameraman, along with Özel and Meletli were arrested 
upon the order of the then-Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş himself, and were tried at 
military court on grounds of the Article 155 of the former Penal Code, “alienating the 
public from military service”.  
The trials have caused reactions not only in the media, but more importantly, in 
the parliament. In March 1994, Zübeyir Aydar, a parliamentarian from the Democracy 
Party, had proposed a draft law on conscientious objection. This was the first proposal 
on conscientious objection by the Kurdish party—none of the other parties that did not 
belong to the Kurdish political movement was to come up with a similar proposal in the 
years to come. In April, the Social Democratic Populist Party
150
 had come up with a 
draft bill to avoid civilians to be tried at military courts. Even President Süleyman 
Demirel had given a public briefing on the subject, but no avail. Following the decision 
of the State Security Court on lack of jurisdiction, a decision of joint chambers in 
December 1994 allowed the objectors to be tried at military courts, .
151
  
The closed War Resisters’ Assocation in İzmir was reestablished in February 
1994 under the name İzmir War Resisters’ Association. In the autumn 1993, a parallel 
organization was established in İstanbul, entitled İstanbul War Resister’s Association. 
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In the later years, the association was re-opened and re-closed several times under 
different names, among them the Conscientious Objection for Peace Platform and the 
Istanbul Antimilitarist Initiative. After the establishment of the website 
savaskarsitlari.org, it became the main hub of interaction for the conscientious objectors 
around the country.  
Although in the following years the acts of the objectors were mostly organized 
around supporting detained objectors, as objector Ercan Aktaş has noted, 152  other 
campaigns were also able to create some discussion in the media. A Conscientious 
Objectors' Festival was organized in 1998 and 2000, with the involvement of 400 and 
1000 participants, respectively, some of whom were former military school students.
153
 
The invasion of Iraq provided some opportunities to the movement; however, in the 
midst of wide campaign to prevent Turkey to be involved in the war, the conscientious 
objectors were not loud enough to pick from the crowd. In January 2003, the Peace 
Initiative had organized an international conference entitled Assembly of the 100s, 
bringing together 3000 individuals to raise the voice of the opposition to the war in Iraq 
and Turkey’s involvement in it.154  
From 2004 onwards for three consecutive years, the objectors have celebrated 
the “May 15 Day of Conscientious Objection” as what they called a “Militourism 
Festival.” The festival series were important as they reflected the aspects that the 
movement wanted to highlight — making the detained objectors, the ongoing war and 
militarism visible along with its patriarchal heterosexual culture as well as promotion of 
antagonisms against foreigners — while at the same time remaining obedient to the 
principle of nonviolent activism.
155
 With these aims, they paid visits to military 
barracks, conscription offices, war monuments, and companies owned by the military. 
They visited marketplaces where conscripted men purchase their needs including not 
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only clothing, but also posters and music tapes that appeal to their heterosexual 
inclinations. Military hospitals were also visited as places where gays had been 
humiliated by requesting visual material to prove sexual orientation. During these visits, 
they keep using alternative means of activism. In addition to previous methods such as 
street theaters and concerts, they use traditional dances to remove the “fairy dust of 
invisibility” on the conscientious objectors, leave broken guns in front of militarily 
owned companies.
156
 
In December 2007, a petition campaign was initiated by SavasKarsitlari.org 
against Article 318 of the Turkish Penal Code that defines alienating the public from 
military service—former Article 155. 157  The law was intensified after it was 
incorporated into the Anti-Terror Law in 2006. Several intellectuals, artists, musicians 
and activists were tried based on this article, including the member of the Conscientious 
Objection Commission of the Human Rights Foundation Doğan Özkan, due to a public 
statement he made during the Human Rights Week events in 2004; writer Perihan 
Mağden, due to an article she had published in the weekly Yeni Aktüel, entitled 
“Conscientious Objection is a Human Right;” and Vice President of the Liberty and 
Solidarity Party Saruhan Oluç, due to an article published in a monthly in 1993.158  
Another case worthy to mention with regards to Article 318 was about the 
Turkish saying, “Each Turk is born a soldier.” During a campaign to support the 
conscientious objector Enver Aydemir, five individuals including objector Savda had 
used the motto “Each Turk is is born a baby” so as to reflect, in the words of the 
defendant in the case Fatih Tezcan, “how the Kemalist wing had been using military 
service as a camp for propaganda.”159 After the first hearing in April 2011, at the fourth 
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hearing the “defendants” requested a gynaecologist as a court expert.160 In July 2011, 
European Bureau for Conscientious Objection had presented a report to the Council of 
Europe where this case was also quoted, along with the recommendation for the 
abolishment of Article 318.
161
 The case was closed in December 2012. In the decision, 
the act was recognized within the scope of Articles 18 (freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion) and 19 (freedom of opinion and expression) of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, and Articles 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and 10 
(freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms.
162
 The case was important both it reflected the reaction of the conscientious 
objectors to the normalization and culturalization of military service,
163
 and for a 
Turkish court had decided in favor of the objectors. 
In 2010, the International Hrant Dink Award was given to the Conscientious 
Objectors of Turkey. In his speech, objector Mehmet Tarhan has underlined the 
significance of militarism within the conscientious objection movement: “Each 
declaration of conscientious objection is a personal contract to struggle against 
militarism and to talk in the language of peace.”164 
Finally, in December 2011, a campaign was initiated to have conscientious 
objection recognized in civil law. Although the pronounced goal was recognition of 
conscientious objection as a right, the principle of the campaign was defined as 
“clearing society from militarism.” As the first step of this campaign, 123 academicians 
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had signed a petition demanding the right to conscientious objection.
165
 In the 
campaign, the objectors have defined their demands as follows: 
(i) The right to conscientious objection must be recognized as a 
fundamental human right that is accessible and usable by 
everyone. The Law on Military Service No. 1111 must be 
abolished and be replaced by a new legislation that also includes 
the right to conscientious objection,  
(ii) It is unlawful for conscientious objectors to be tried at military 
courts. All the cases based on Articles 63, 66, 87, 88 of the 
Military Penal Code
166
 that the objectors are being tried must be 
abated. Article 45 of the same law, which limits freedom of 
religion and conscience, must be abolished. 
(iii) Article 318 of the Turkish Penal Code, which defines the crime 
“alienating the public from military,” must be abolished. 
(iv) The damages with respect to the conscientious objectors who had 
been imprisoned or been condemned to “civil death” have to be 
compensated. 
(v) Conscientious objector İnan Süver who has served in prison for 
16 months, and Muhammed Serdar Delice, who had been arrested 
on November 27 have to be released.
167
 
 
Since then, Delice was released, Süver was released but rearrested. The rest of 
the demands listed in 2011 are still current today. As of December 2012, conscientious 
objectors are planning for an international conscientious objectors’ meeting that will 
cover the countries of the Mediterranean, to be held in May 2013.
168
  
 
 
3.1.3. Cases of Turkish Conscientious Objectors at ECtHR 
 
Although conscientious objection has been a matter on which Turkey has been 
criticized in all the progress reports of the European Commission since the accession 
negotiations began, it was with the case of Osman Murat Ülke and the decision of 
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European Court of Human Rights against Turkey that the situation of conscientious 
objectors in Turkey has come to the forefront and became a subject of public discussion.  
On the International Day of Peace, 1 September 1995, Osman Murat Ülke, a 
member of the War Resisters’ Association, has burnt his papers calling him to military 
service at a press conference in İzmir.169 He got arrested In November 1996. This was to 
be one of the many times that he would be tried on the basis of “alienating the public 
from military service,” “insubordination,” “persistent disobedience,” and “desertation;” 
following vicious cycle of custody, trial, imprisonment, mistreatment, reconscription, 
re-declaration of conscientious objection, etc. When he was discharged in March 1999, 
he had already served 701 days in prison, yet still had 17.5 more months to serve as 
imposed after his last conviction.
170
 
Following Ülke’s arrest, an Anti-Militarist Initiative (AMI) was formed in 
Istanbul, along with an alarm network and solidarity groups in different cities in Turkey, 
and with the support of War Resisters International, in countries such as Belgium, 
Spain, France and Germany. Turkish and Kurdish individuals made collective 
declarations of conscientious objection. In 1997 Human Rights Association of Turkey 
awarded the Human Rights Prize to Ülke. The Association of German Protestant 
Churches and Missions has also given a human right award to İzmir War Resisters’ 
Association. In 1998, Amnesty International began a campaign where Ülke was defined 
as the “conscientious objector imprisoned for life.”171 Later that the year, on the fiftieth 
anniversary of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Amnesty International 
declared Ülke as the symbol of Article 18, i.e., freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.
172
 The following year, in December 1999, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention took up his case and concluded that the principle of ne bis in idem, i.e., no 
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one shall be repeatedly convicted of a crime which they have already acquited.
173
 
Interestingly enough, when Vedat Zencir, as an act of civil disobedience and of support 
for Ülke, re-declared his objection on a press conference and written a complaint about 
himself to the State Security Court, he neither was arrested, nor sued. Still, several 
intellectuals were tried on the basis of alienating public from military service.
174
   
In January 1997 the case was brought to the European Commission of Human 
Rights, and was transmitted to the European Court of Human Rights in November 1998. 
The application was made on the basis that the series and proceedings and convictions 
that Ülke went through had breached Articles 3 (prohibition of torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment), 5 (right to liberty and security), 8 (right to respect 
for private and family life), and 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
175
 In June 2004 the case was declared 
admissible. In the decision taken in January 2006, the Court has concluded that Ülke 
had been living a “clandestine life, amounting almost to ‘civil death.’” It has decided 
unanimously that Turkey had violated Article 3 of the Convention, charged Turkey with 
damages equivalent to 10,000 Euros and 1000 for costs and expenses, but did not see it 
necessary to examine the complaints under Articles 5, 8 and 9 of the convention.
176
 
Thus, although the Court had decided against Turkey, the decision did not make a 
significant impact on the recognition of conscientious objection as a human right. If it at 
all did, it was symbolic. 
The decision helped the visibility of the matter in public, however. NGOs began 
awarding Ülke and the Association with human rights prizes yet again after ten years. In 
2007, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War Clara has given 
Immerwahr Award for antiwar and disarmament activists to Ülke.177  
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Following the 2006 decision of the Court, Turkish authorities, during the june 
2007 meeting of Committee of Ministers, have informed the Committee about a draft 
law prepared to prevent the violations of Article 3, which would prevent prosecutions 
and convictions based on “persistent disobedience.” The Committee, as the supervisor 
to the execution of the Court’s judgments,178 followed up the case. In its October 2007 
resolution on the case, the Committee emphasized the lack of “specific provision in 
Turkish law governing the sanctions for those who refused to perform military service 
on conscientious or religious grounds,” and urged the Turkish authorities “to take 
without further delay all necessary measures to put an end to the violation of the 
applicant’s rights under the Convention.” 179  Two years later, in its March 2009 
resolution, the Council “firmly recalled” the Turkish state on the obligation of every 
state to abide by the judgments of the Court under Article 46/1 of the Convention, and 
“strongly urged” the Turkish authorities for taking the necessary measures.180 Finally, in 
June 2011, the Committee set a deadline for Turkey, and invited Turkey to adopt the 
necessary legislative measures “without any further delay after the general elections of 
June 2011.”181  
While the Committee was busy warning Turkey to hold its promise, the Court 
had taken two significant decisions where it changed the precedent. In July 2011, the 
Court concluded the case about the citizen of Armenia Vahan Bayatyan. As a Jehovah’s 
Witness, Bayatyan had declared in writing
182
 in 2001 that he had “trained his 
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conscience by the Bible” and “consciously” refused to perform military service. 
Although he had noted that he was ready to perform alternative military service, it was 
declined. He got arrested in 2002, was released after serving 10 months in prison. 
Bayatyan applied to the ECtHR in 2003. Following the hearing at the Court in 
November, 2010, the Court made its decision in July 2011: Armenia had violated 
Article 9 of the Convention, and the state was to pay to Bayatyan 10,000 Euros in 
damages and 10,000 Euros in costs and expenses.
183
 This decision was the first time that 
the Court had based its argument on Article 9, hence clearly recognizing conscientious 
objection within the scope of freedom of conscience.  
While the Bayatyan decision was expected to have an indirect impact on 
Turkey,
184
 the decision on the case of Yunus Erçep directly involved Turkey. Erçep was 
a citizen of Turkey. Born in 1969, he was baptized as a Jehovah’s Witness in 1982. 
After he was called for the military in 1998, 25 lawsuits were filed against him. He had 
applied to the Court in 2004 claiming violation of Articles 5 (right to liberty and 
security), 6 (right to a fair trial), 7 (no punishment without law), 9 (freedom of thought 
conscience and religion), and 13 (right to an effective remedy). Upon evaluating the 
case, in November 2011, the Court had declared the violation of Article 6 as the trial in 
Turkey was not independent and objective, and Article 9 as Erçep held a conscientious 
objector status.
185
  
The following months have witnessed the biggest discussion on conscientious 
objection to date. Conscientious objection has breached its usual limited media organs, 
and became a topic of discussion in the mass media, including newspapers such as 
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Hürriyet and television channels such as CNNTürk. First, in mid-October, just before 
the “deadline” was reached, the Minister of Justice Sadullah Ergin declared that the 
issue was to be concluded within a week’s time,186  yet the right to objection was 
planned to be limited to “freedom of religion and conscience only.”187 Then, the Deputy 
Prime Minister Bülent Arınç made a six-month promise following which a legislation 
on conscientious objection would be laid out.
188
 Vice President of Republican People’s 
Party Sezgin Tanrıkulu had made a pro-declaration that they had also been working on 
the matter.
189
 As the discussions extended into the following year, even the Director of 
Religious Affairs had made a public statement on the subject, declaring that 
conscientious objection is “unwarrantable” according to Islam.190 Nevertheless, another 
simultaneously growing discussion was on exemption from military service through 
payment, which constituted a potential block in front of conscientious objection.
191
 The 
discussions were sharply ended with Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s declaration that 
“such a regulation has never been in the agenda of our government… I hope that 
exemption from military service by payment will be for the good of our country, nation, 
youth, and their families.”192 
Meanwhile, statements on the matter were also flowing from Europe as well. 
Conscientious objection had been a matter of discussion in the Annual Progress Reports 
by the European Commission since the accession negotiations had begun. In October 
2011, General Secretary to the Council of Europe Thorbjorn Jagland has further invited 
                                                          
186
 “’Vicdani Ret’ Karara Bağlanıyor,” Radikal Gazetesi, 14.11.2011, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&CategoryID=77&Art
icleID=1069511. 
187
 “Vicdani Reddin Sınırı Şimdilik Dar Olabilir,” Radikal Gazetesi, 16.11.2011, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1069654
&CategoryID=78. 
188
 “Arınç’tan Vicdani Ret Açıklaması,” Hürriyet Gazetesi, 1.12.2011, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/19371084.asp. 
189
 Ibid.. 
190
 “Diyanet Vicdani Redde Fetva Vermiyor,” Milli Gazete, 16.4.2012, 
http://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/vicdani-red-caiz-degil-236007.htm. 
191
 “Hükümetten Bedelli İtirafı: Herkesin İstifade Edeceğini Düşünmeyin,” Radikal 
Gazetesi, 19.11.2011, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1070043
&CategoryID=78. 
192
 “Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Vicdani Ret Açıklaması,” Hürriyet Gazetesi, 22.11.2012, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/19303120.asp#. 
60 
 
Turkey to take the necessary measures.
193
 In November, the Turkish Judge at the 
ECtHR Işıl Karakaş has also emphasized in an interview that Turkey “definitely had to 
recognize the right to conscientious objection.”194 
Nevertheless, the responses to the discussions from the objectors’ side were not 
positive. Hülya Üçpınar, the advocate to Osman Murat Ülke, had stated that the 
proposal as mentioned by Minister Ergin was not a satisfactory attempt in solving the 
problems of the objectors. Conscientious objector Halil Savda had responded by 
declaring that most of the objectors were against legislation as such that disguised 
militarism under alternative civilian service.
195
 This statement was also significant as it 
reflected the anti-militarist agenda of the objection movement and where the roadmap 
may lead to after a legislation would be passed. Savda made the stance of the objectors 
with regards the exemption-by-payment option clear: “For the armed forces, neither one 
lira, nor one minute!”196  
In December 2011, it became clear that the whole discussion was a fuss. After a 
14-hour discussion in the parliament, Minister of National Security İsmet Yılmaz had 
declared that a short-term practice that would allow exemption from military service in 
return for payment,
197
 but no regulation would be made about conscientious objection. 
An amendment was to be made in the law, which would be framed around the 
conviction by the ECtHR on the ne bis in idem principle; i.e., it would merely remove 
multiple imprisonments.
198
 Objector Mehmet Tarhan criticized this proposal by stating 
                                                          
193
 “Vicdani Ret Orduyu Güçlendirir,” Radikal Gazetesi, 15.11.2011, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&CategoryID=77&Art
icleID=1069588&CMessageID=931270&CRes=1#fc931270. 
194
 “Vicdani Ret Mutlaka Uygulanmalı,” NTVMSNBC.com, 28.11.2011, 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25300906. 
195
 “Vicdani Ret Yasası Retçilerin Taleplerini Karşılamaz,” Bianet, 15.11.2011, 
http://www.bianet.org/bianet/bianet/134041-vicdani-ret-yasasi-retcilerin-taleplerini-
karsilamaz. 
196
 Mehmet Atakan Foça, “Askerliğe Ne Bir Lira, Ne Bir Saniye,” Bianet, 20.12.2012, 
http://bianet.org/bianet/ifade-ozgurlugu/134885-askerlige-ne-bir-lira-ne-bir-saniye 
197
 Provisional Clause 46, in the Law on the Recruitment of Military Personnel, “Askere 
Alma Kanunu,” Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, 30.11.2011-6252/4, 
http://www.asal.msb.gov.tr/kanun/1111_as.kanunu.pdf. 
198
 “Vicdani Retçinin Adresi Hapishane Olacak,” Radikal Gazetesi, 1.12.2012, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1071174
&CategoryID=77. 
61 
 
that Turkey had to view conscientious objection not as a crime to be punished, but 
within the category of rights.
199
 
After the Erçep case, the Court had taken three additional and consecutive 
decisions that were significant for the purposes of this study—the cases of Feti 
Demirtaş, Halil Savda and Mehmet Tarhan. The Demirtaş case was parallel to that or 
Erçep. The cases of Savda and Tarhan, however, were different as unlike Erçep and 
Demirtaş, Savda and Tarhan had based their objections on secular grounds. Thus, even 
though the Court had considered Erçep’s objection within the scope of Article 9 as 
“freedom of belief” and could as well evaluate the Demirtaş case in the same parallel, 
the Savda and Tarhan cases could have resulted with a different decision due to the 
secular justification of their objections. 
Feti Demirtaş baptised as a Jehovah’s Witness at the age of 20. In the three 
letters he wrote to the Ministry of Defense, Demirtaş refused to serve in the military, but 
stated that he was willing to perform alternative civilan service. He was arrested in 2005 
and served two years in prison. Following the application submitted to the ECtHR, in its 
January 2012, the Court decided that Turkey had violated Articles 3, 6 and 9 of the 
Convention, and awarded Demirtaş 15,000 Euros in damages and 5000 Euros for costs 
and expenses.
200
 
Halil Savda was a Kurdish political activist who was arrested at the age of 20 for 
“aiding and abetting” member(s) of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Two years 
later, in 1996, he was called for military service; although he was conscripted, he 
deserted the regiment after three months. Later he was re-arrested in possession of a 
weapon, and was imprisoned for carrying acts for the PKK. He was released in 
November 2004 and was transferred to the military regiment for completing his military 
service, but he declared his conscientious objection.
201
  
In April 2008 he was subjected to psychological tests at the military hospital, 
and was diagnosed to have “anti-social personality disorder,” as a result of which he 
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was exempted from military service. By 2011 he had been arrested several times, and 
had served 17 months in prison. On the Human Rights Day in December 2011, 
Amnesty International used him as a symbol of human rights, and organized a petition 
campaign for his release.
202
 In February 2012, he was re-arrested due to a public 
statement he made in 2006 during a demonstration against the Israeli occupation of 
Lebanon; he had declared his support for the Israeli conscientious objectors, which was 
evaluated within the scope of Article 318.
203
 The arrest was condemned both by 
Amnesty International and the Human Rights Foundation; in the condemnation, both 
organizations declared that “Article 318 blesses militarism.”204  
Savda had applied to the European Court of Human Rights in 2005, claiming 
violation of Articles 6 (right to a fair trial), 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion) and 10 (right to freedom of expression) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In its decision in June 2012, the Court declared that Turkey had violated 
Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment), 6 and 9 of 
the Convention, and held that Turkey was to pay to Savda 12,000 Euros in damages and 
2000 Euros in costs and expenses.
205
   
The case of Mehmet Tarhan was no less interesting. Tarhan was a Kurdish 
homosexual activist who had declared his conscientious objection in 2001. Having 
made his declaration in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, in his declaration Tarhan referred 
to the Afghan war, but situated himself against all wars and militarist mechanisms, 
referred to state registration systems as control mechanisms, and declared that he was 
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wholly against the state structure along with the particular duties imposed upon him by 
the state. Furthermore, he also refused the military exemption option offered to 
homosexuals as a “right” in return for receiving a health report that classifies the given 
individual “rotten.” It is important to quote him here due to the wide spectrum of issues 
that he has touched upon in his declaration, which may therefore be used as a summary 
declaration for the movement:   
“I will not be of service to any militarist mechanism. I am yearning for a 
humanity that is purified of violence, distant to power struggles, free of 
all borders and in harmony with nature. …I do not believe in the 
necessity for the state apparatus and do not feel attachment to any state. 
The state that claims me as its citizen wants to conscript me and turn me 
into an instrument of war that will kill and die, if need be, to ensure its 
vitality. …I will not allow this and preserve my beliefs. I also consider 
the “rotten report” offered to me for I am homosexual as the rottenness of 
the militarist structure. …Ultimately, I will serve in the military under no 
circumstances. I also invite everyone not to serve, …to object to control 
mechanisms such as ID and social security numbers... The only way to 
stop wars is to drain their human source.”206 
 
In February 2005, an investigation was opened about Tarhan in relation to the 
press releases read during the objectors’ day in 2004. In April 2005 he was arrested. The 
following day, when he was about to be transferred to the military regiment, he was sent 
off with a group of antimilitarists and anarchists who chanted “the greatest objector is 
our objector” as opposed to the slogan “the greatest soldier is our soldier” used when 
conscripts are sent off to military service. Having refused to wear uniform or obey 
orders, he was tried in military court based on persistent disobedience. A health report 
was prepared against his will, which stated that he was “unfit” (“rotten”) for the 
military. Various support demonstrations were held during his imprisonment by 
anarchist, antimilitarist, LGBT groups, Kurdish activist groups, and other human rights 
activists. In May 2005, the Human Rights Association had organized a press release 
event, and the Freedom and Solidarity Party published a press release demanding 
Tarhan’s release. The World Tribunal on Iraq suggested to dedicate a seat to Tarhan on 
the “Jury of Conscience” that was to hold its final session in June in Istanbul. In June 
2005, War Resisters’ International has published a report on conscientious objection in 
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Turkey, where they called for international action.
207
 In March 2006, Tarhan deserted 
his regiment.  
An application was submitted to the court in the name of Tarhan in February 
2006. After declaring the case admissible in 2009, the Court published its decision in 
July 2012. The Court, unanimously, held that Articles 3 and 9 of the Convention were 
violated, and sentenced Turkey to 10,000 Euros in damages and 2300 Euros for costs 
and expenses.
208
 Despite the decision of the Court, Tarhan remains to be wanted by the 
police since his desertion in March 2006. 
 
 
3.2. Variants and Divisions in the Movement 
 
Although conscientious objection as a collective act of civil disobedience had 
emerged in the 1990s as an anarchist and antimilitarist initiative, conscientious 
objectors in Turkey are dispersed in a wider political and religious spectrum. Pacifist 
religious denominations such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses had been living in Turkey 
before the 1990s, but they have neither been taking this stance as a political act, nor 
have taken collective action to demand the right to conscientious objection. The 
movement that emerged in the 1990s was organized around total objection, and was 
utterly political, trying to leave an impact on the Kurdish issue, while at the same time 
demanding the right to conscientious objection.  
As their actions became visible in the following years, the initiative began to 
grow and vary within itself. During the interview with objector Tayfun Gönül published 
in the weekly Sokak, Gönül had specified three potential groups from whom the 
conscientious objection movement could gain support. The feminists, as to him 
militarism was, indisputably, a male ideology, and therefore stood as one of the main 
issues of the feminist movement. The Kurds, as there was a non-declared civil war 
against the Kurdish nation. By not participating in the war, Gönül saw himself as in 
betrayal of both his own sex and his national identity—for the Kurds, this probably 
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would be the opposite. He also expected support from the Muslims as the state was not 
religious, and serving in such an army would be problematic for them as well.
209
 As he 
has expected, the following 20 years has witnessed the emergence not only of these 
three groups of objectors, but also LGBTs, nationalist objectors, and high school 
students. Nevertheless, the various levels of politicization in these objector groups as 
well as the differing types of police repression to which they had been subjected, caused 
divisions within the movement, along with a mocking discussion of who the “most,” 
“best” or “real” objector is. 
 
 
3.2.1. Jehovah’s Witnesses 
 
Jehovah’s Witnesses are the quiet group of objectors in Turkey. Defining 
themselves as the follower of the said Christian denomination, they refuse to serve in 
the military based on the Bible, verse Isaiah 2.4: “...and they shall beat their swords into 
plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against 
nation, neither shall they learn war anymore.” 
This verse became the basic source of argument that was used both in Vahan 
Bayatyan’s, Yunus Erçep’s and Feti Demirtaş’ cases at the EctHR in 2011.210  The 
Bayatyan decision, followed by Erçep constituted the legal ground upon which 
individuals could claim conscientius objection as a fundamental right within the scope 
of freedom of conscience and belief. The 2012 Demirtaş decision, proved the Court’s 
consistency in case law.  
Nevertheless, unlike the total objectors, Jehovah’s Witnesses in Turkey do not 
try to organize around activist groups to have their religious practice recognized by law. 
Just as they viewing objection to military service as a duty defined by god, they also 
prefer to live through and suffer, if need be, in the set legal procedure of the country 
they live in so as to complete their religious duties. Viewing this service as an 
individual practice, Jehovah’s Witnesses also refuse to receive public support when they 
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are imprisoned. The editor of SavaşKarşıtları.org, Oğuz Sönmez, has also noted their 
experiences with the followers of this faith: 
“Today, Jehovah’s Witnesses are the only group to follow [conscientious 
objection] within its religious characteristics, and they really are very 
hardedged. They are more hardedged and consistent then us. ... When we 
posted the story of Barış, we called his lawyer and asked whether we 
could give him our support. He replied, ‘Why have you even posted him 
on your website!?” They do not favor this at all. There should not be any 
propaganda whatsoever. It is our experience, and we will suffer through 
it by ourselves. That’s their attitude.”211 
 
The objector that Sönmez had referred to was Barış Görmez. Described as “a 
basketball player 2 meters tall, not even able to fit in the bunked bed,” Sönmez 
contrasted Görmez’s pacifist stance with his body shape. Until his release in February 
2012, Görmez had served 4 years in prison, during which he was tried for disobedience 
12 times. Following the Bayatyan decision of the ECtHR, in March 2012, Isparta 
Military Court had decided to free Görmez based on the Article 90 of the Turkish 
Constitution, i.e., supramecy of internatinal law.
212
  
 
 
3.2.2. Total Objectors 
 
“I hereby repeat that I will not be in cooperation with the militarist 
apparatus. Because, I am a TOTAL OBJECTOR! 
For I do not recognize any higher authority, I refuse to receive or issue 
orders. Because, I am DISOBEDIENT! 
I will continue to act for a just and free world without nations, countries 
and wars, and I will not be the soldier of anybody. Because, I am an 
ANARCHIST!” – Yavuz Atan, 1993 (capitalization original)213 
 
The movement that emerged in the 1990s was organized around total objection, 
and was utterly political, struggling against militarism and trying to leave an impact on 
the Kurdish issue, while at the same time demanding the right to conscientious 
objection. Despite the generalized pacifist name of their association, “War Resisters,” 
they had come to the forefront to bring an end to one war above all, i.e., the war 
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between Kurdish insurgents and the Turkish state. Their collective public declarations 
as individuals who refuse to serve in neither of the armies, they believed, presented an 
alternative stand to the war. The “waves” of declarations, street demonstrations, and due 
to the unlawful nature of the act, trials would draw the attention of the media and the 
public.  Although this stance was not visible in the declarations of the first decade, their 
campaigns such as the 1993 campaign with the motto “Neither the military, nor the 
mountain!” made this point clear. In their interviews, they also made statements about 
the need for coherence between an individual’s identity as an objector, and his/her 
stance towards the ongoing war.  
“It is normal that the number of conscientious objectors in Turkey is not 
high. One objector may come up and say this: ‘I am against the dirty war 
in Kurdistan, I can never serve in the Turkish military.’ Based on 
common thinking mechanisms, that person may easily be taken aside and 
be defined as a supporter of the PKK. … This is not to say that one 
cannot become a conscientious objector with such motivations. However, 
his/her justification for the act of conscientious objection should not be 
based on those ideologies.”214 
 
Taken from an interview with Osman Murat Ülke, these words are reflective of 
the dilemma of the total objectors in their effort to widen support. On one hand, they 
had a political agenda that they wanted to achieve, therefore the total objectors were 
willing to draw borders around the concept of conscientious objection. On the other 
hand, they were trying to remain a democratic initiative, which required them not to 
impose a dominant definition of conscientious objection. Moreover, if one of their 
major aims was to have conscientious objection recognized as a right, then they had to 
welcome as many people as possible so as to have the initiative evolve into a social 
movement. At this point, the category of total objection came in handy; it allowed a 
division within the movement, while at the same time allowing other political 
denominations to support or become a part of the movement. Hence, during the public 
demonstrations or support campaigns for detained objectors, what type of objector the 
supported individual had been became an important element in their campaigns. Still, 
despite this sensitivity of total objectors about the Kurdish issue, and despite the 
campaigns they held, some objectors – especially the Kurdish objectors – criticize the 
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first decade of the movement as a period when “not much attention was paid to the 
reality of the war.”215 
 
 
3.2.3. Kurdish Objectors 
 
The objection declarations began to include statements about the war in Turkey 
only in the 2004 with Doğan Özkan, who stated that “Kurdish, Palestinian, and Iraqi 
and many other nations are being subjected to torture, exile and massacres by states.”216 
In 2004, Halil Savda mentioned his former ownership of weapons and membership of 
the PKK in his declaration. Ercan Aktaş, also a Kurdish total objector, recalls the 
resistance among the other objectors against Savda’s objection due to his former 
membership.
217
 Although Savda later became a significant element in the movement, 
objections to his membership was the signal of a future division with the non-
antimilitarist Kurdish objectors. 
In 2005, Eylem Barış was the first objector to openly declare his refusal of the 
ignorance or rejection policies of the Turkish state with regards to the Kurdish nation. In 
2007, Ahmet Aslan referred to these policies as a “genocide of identity and culture.” In 
2008, yet another Kurdish objector, Mehmet Ali Avcı, declared his objection to being a 
“Turkish Citizen” and to being a soldier in the Turkish military which he referred to as a 
criminal organization: 
“As an individual within the Kurdish Nation, … I have never accepted to 
be a “Turkish Citizen” in the Republic of Turkey. 
As a Kurdish citizen, I officially declare my objection to serve in Military 
of the Republic of Turkey, the state that that diseases my language, 
economic, political, social, cultural, shortly all human rights, and to 
become a part of the crimes against humanity committed by its 
Military.”218 
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In 2009, the initiative chose to reorganize under a new title, Conscientious 
Objection for Peace Platform. The primary aim of the new establishment was defined as 
taking a stance with regards to the ongoing war.
219
 The most recent act within the 
initiative was also oriented at the Kurdish issue and was organized by Savda. Following 
the airplane bombings of 34 Kurdish citizens near the town of Roboski (in the 
southeastern province of Şırnak) in December 2011, Savda decided to take an act. 
Beginning on the peace day, September 1, 2012, he began to walk a 1300 km distance 
from Roboski to Ankara. The 50 day walk was discussed in the mass media as well.
220
  
The Platform was not supported by all the former antimilitarist total objectors, 
however. Yavuz Atan, for instance, highlights the difference in the terminology of 
choice between the Peace Platform and the former War Resisters.  
“I cannot speak of what the Conscientious Objection for Peace Platform. 
I was not among them, because, the term ‘peace’ does not coincide with 
my views. I am a war resister; the agreement of two states or the 
handshake of two commanders would mean to cover the blood spilt until 
then and to continue the status quo.”221 
 
In September 2010, another group of conscientious objectors began to appear. 
Referring themselves as the “Kurdish Conscientious Objection Movement,” these 
objectors, similar to the early War Resisters’ Association, made public objection 
declarations wherein they refused to participate in both the Turkish Armed Forces and 
the Kurdish guerilla. Some of these declarations were even mediated by the Human 
Rights Association in Istanbul, and supported by the Socialist Party of the Oppressed, 
and the Peace and Democracy Party, whose MPs were present in the declaration 
event.
222
 
Nevertheless, in the later months, the nature as well as the method of the 
declarations began to change. Instead of organizing press release events, the objectors 
began sending their declarations to the Platform, sometimes without any statement of 
objection. Later on, these “notifications” from the Kurdish objectors began to turn into 
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news in the media where not even the names of the objectors were declared. Such 
methods caused discomfort among the total objectors—as long as the names were not 
evident, as long as the individuals did not make their statements in public, as long as 
their statements were not forwarded to the Ministry of National Defense or the related 
conscription office, these declarations would not constitute an act of civil disobedience. 
Such nameless declaration news that state only the number of objectors in a given city, 
was no different than news informing about the number of draft evaders whose 
intentions were unknown. 
In addition to their method of objection, these later individuals also advocated a 
different type of objection—unlike the war resisters who were against being a party or 
taking a side in the ongoing war, the Kurdish objectors had centered their argument on 
objecting to participate only in the Turkish military. This stance had become clear with 
the emphasis of the Kurdish objectors on “not being an antimilitarist movement.” Later 
on, the Kurdish objectors wanted to reflect their different stance in the outlook as well. 
Whereas until then Savaskarsitlari.com had been keeping a list of objectors’ names on 
the website, the Kurdish objectors, according to Yavuz Atan, requested their names to 
be published as a separate list.
223
 By March 2011, the collective objections by the 
Kurdish Conscientious Objection Movement ceased. Atan notes that this may be due to 
a decision by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party who might have decided that the objections 
were not functional. Another reason, he argues, may be the listing of names, which 
might have caused security related concerns.
224
  
 
 
3.2.4. Women Objectors 
 
Objection declarations by women conscientious objectors were distinctly 
significant in highlighting the patriarchal gender roles that were overlooked by the male 
objectors, hence strengthening the political foundations of the movement with a 
feminist outlook. Although they had been giving support to the objectors in 
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demonstrations, petitions, and various types of activism, they were still seen peripheral 
to the movement, as they were not required to serve in the military. Hence, women 
conscientious objector Hilal Demir draws attention to the inclination of conscientious 
objection movement to become a forum for male politics. Just as the military did not 
find women “worthy” enough for military service and did not grant them the “right to 
serve” their country as a “noble” citizen, neither did the conscientious objectors: 
“My objection was calling attention to the risk of this movement 
becoming some kind of forum for male politics and reminding us that 
militarism can’t be confined to military service. That women have no 
place in the Turkish army is due to the perception that we are not deemed 
worthy of such a “noble” institution. This means that compulsory service 
is not just a practice of “national defense,” but also serves to differentiate 
between men’s and women’s citizenship and their place in society.”225 
 
Thus, the first objections by women on the Conscientious Objectors Day of May 
2004, gave the women objectors a chance to move to the center of the movement, and, 
in the words of Ferda Ülker, to “become the subject of the process within which they 
had previously been perceived as supporters.”226  
In her declaration, İnci Ağlagül established women’s relations to compulsory 
military service as the sisters, daughters, mothers, friends and lovers of the conscripted. 
Nazan Askeran strikingly expresses how value systems impact these relations and cause 
establishment of patriarchal control and possession upon women. 
“I do not want to be under possession of someone, to be closed up based 
on an awry thought such that I am someone’s chastity, to be beaten, to be 
killed for being a WOMAN. I do not want to be ruled, directed, tailed by 
some and the society who assume that they put me under control by the 
labels ‘mother,’ ‘wife,’ ‘offspring,’ nor not to have any say or right on 
my body.”227  
 
Ferda Ülker points out how these roles to which women are subjected are also 
extensions of militarism. Militarism, as Ülker puts it, does not only remain in the 
barracks; it constructs a world where militarism is rubbed in to the daily life: “In this 
construction, womanhood is humiliated, ignored, ignored. [Militarism’s] notions are 
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authority, hierarchy, obedience.”228 As Cynthia Enloe puts it, unless they waded in the 
strong tides of patriarchy, they would reinforce it.
229
 
Among the women conscientious objectors, Kurdish women objectors had yet a 
more significant place. Just as it was with the men objectors, women objectors were 
highly motivated by the propaganda for the war, and the particular roles attributed to 
women within it. All the mottos used in the culturalization of militarism in the Turkish 
culture had a counterpart in Kurdish. The saying “Every Turk is born a soldier” was 
rephrased as “Every Kurd is born a guerilla,” hence imposing the same obedient wife, 
or sacred mother identities on Kurdish women. The warrior attribution, however, was 
even stronger. “That who fights becomes free; that who is freed becomes pretty; that 
who is pretty becomes loved.” Ayşe Gül Altınay points to the encouraging effect of this 
construction and exemplifies it with Zeynep Kınacı, the first women in the Kurdish 
movement to perform a suicide attack, as a result of which 6 soldiers were killed and 
more than 30 were injured in 1996 in the province Tunceli—formerly Dersim. 
All in all, women objectors have taken the issue from the hegemony of men, 
claimed themselves not only supporters but subjects in the movement, signified the 
connection between militarism, patria and patriarchia, and hence made themselves a 
major unbreakable component of the movement.  
 
 
3.2.5. LGBT Objectors 
 
Mehmet Tarhan, a Kurdish homosexual objector, highlighted the significance of 
the civil war for him at a conference. Born in Lice, Diyarbakır, a town “burnt down 
twice by the state”, Tarhan mockingly described how he was born into a Kurdish family 
but was unable to speak Kurdish; how he had become a civil servant at the age of 16 
and became the figurehead state-authority since “the only real authority there was the 
military.” He expressed the paradoxical feelings he experienced while holding the 
position of a “state authority,” as he witnessed the clashes, the shattered bodies of 
Kurdish guerillas, and the wounded children to help whom he was called even though 
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he was a veterinarian by training.  “As I debated all these, I became very close to 
‘taking the mountain.’ What held me back was my homosexual identity.” Holding 
himself back from the mountain, he was left with the other option, i.e., the military 
service. Thus, he began questioning militarism.  
“The war made me question militarism. As I see it, questioning 
militarism—i.e., antimilitarism—is the opposition to a totality or a 
system of different types of power relations that consolidate each other, 
including heterosexism, sexism, and tyranny of human upon the nature. 
The ‘opposition,’ here, is not only verbal—it’s weaving your life against 
this totality, beginning from the tiniest element.”230 
 
After all the domestic and international campaigns organized in his name, today 
Tarhan notes in the past two years he came to realize that he was “not recognized as an 
objector until he was imprisoned.” Although he had participated in the movement for 
four years prior to his declaration, his fellows had not regarded him as a “subject of the 
movement.”  
“There is one circumstance that we share with the woman objectors: 
simply because I was a homosexual and was not wanted by the military, I 
was not considered a proper citizen to be ‘awarded with rights and 
responsibilities.’ It was only after I was imprisoned that wider audiences 
began to like me, my objector status became indisputable, I was 
described as much anarchist
231
 and courageous as never before—I can’t 
describe the feeling, most of the time I fall in love with myself when I 
hear all this. [laughs]”232  
 
Thus, it is interesting to see the parallels between the other as depicted by the 
state and by the movement itself. Just as the state depicted a proper citizen with its 
ethnicity, religious sect, and sexual orientation, the conscientious objectors had also 
created a proper objector among themselves. It required effort for women and LGBT 
activists to change their position from mere supporters to subjects. While the description 
of the courageous and heroic soldier was criticized as the reproduction of the militarist 
manhood, the same features were being attributed to the conscientious objectors—no 
one would be accepted into the fraternity of objectors unless they proved to possess 
these qualities.  
                                                          
230
 Mehmet Tarhan, speaking at the 10th Green Dialogue Meeting of the Green Party of 
Turkey, 17.12.2011. 
231
 Tarhan, in another conversation, emphasizes that he is not an anarchist as most total 
objectors are, but he does refuse to perform civilian military service. 
232
 Ibid. 
74 
 
Unlike the other objectors discussed above, Tarhan’s declaration was also 
important as he not only rejected compulsory military service, but had also rejected the 
process of getting exempted. This process, due to the humiliating demands and 
treatment towards the applicants, has created a discussion not only in the national but 
also in the international media.
233
 That the Turkish Armed Forces considered LGBT 
individuals as having a “psychosexual disorder” has found its place in the Progress 
Reports of the European Commission as well.
234
 Although former practices such as 
requirement of photographic proof or rectal exam are no longer in practice, the 
applicants are still subjected to various psychological tests and “interviews” to have 
their homosexuality approved by the state.
235
 The latest disciplinary rules drafted for the 
armed forces defined homosexuality as “unnatural affinity” and categorized it among 
the heaviest crimes.
236
 
Some homosexual man had been considering not serving in the military by 
following the path set out by the state as an antimilitarist stance. While on the other 
hand, other homosexuals like Barış Bortaçina had been fiercely criticizing those who 
follow to these practices as succumbing to the militaristic system and the rhetoric 
reproducing it. Exemption from the military was also being exempt from the male 
identity, as well as the particular responsibilities attached to it, such as fighting in a war. 
On the other hand, remaining distant to the war simply by not participating in it 
reflected their ignorance and apathy. Thus Bortaçina was accusing the exempt of 
watching a “systematic and deliberate massacre” in utter apathy, while taking refuge on 
the claim that to fight is a man’s job.237   
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Bortaçina’s criticisms were in line with Tarhan’s reason to refuse. While 
explaining the connections between his Kurdish identity, homosexuality, and his 
decision for total objection, he pointed to the need to refuse to be a part of the rules and 
values set out by the state. “If I was to act within their system of values, if I was to play 
according to their game rules,” he argued, “then I would become a party in the war.”238  
 
 
3.2.6. Muslim and/or Nationalist Objectors 
 
Just like Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslim conscientious objectors differ from the 
total objectors both in the justification on which they build their objection, and on their 
attitude towards alternative civilian service.  
Enver Aydemir was the first individual to use his religious beliefs as the 
justification for his objection when he made his declaration in 2007. As a Kurdish 
Muslim anarchist, his statements were worthy to think. As a Muslim he considered 
human life sacred and opposed killing—unless in self-defense. The Islamic holy war, 
jihad, was not conquest in the name of god; it was the fight for your freedom and was 
valid only when one’s freedom was threatened. As an anarchist he was against state 
structures where select classes formed states and governed them. In his point of view, 
the communal Friday prayers were to be the places of decision making—local 
population was to gather each week after the Friday prayer to discuss and decide by and 
for themselves. As a Kurd, he had lived through various types of discrimination, 
humiliation, as well as imprisonments and mistreatments; on the other hand he still 
condemns PKK due to its methods and the lives it has caused.
239
 
In his declaration of objection, however, we see a reckoning with the secular 
structure of Turkey. Aydemir argues that the elites in the armed forces have “hostile 
feelings” toward his religion, complains about how her mother and wife, who had come 
to visit him two days after he had got arrested but were not taken in to the prison for 
they were wearing headscarves. Thus, he had declared his objection to serve in the 
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military. Still, “considering the realities of the geography” he lived in, he did accept to 
perform alternative civilian service, had he been offered.
240
  
Another different objection came from Muhammed Serdar Delice. Defining 
himself as a nationalist Muslim, he takes pride in Ottoman/Turkish history and Islam. 
Coming from an ultranationalist family whose father had been an active member in the 
upper echelons of the Nationalist Action Party, he had grown up learning that the 
Turkish history had been that of tolerance where all nations were protected. The current 
war in Turkey, he argues, is degeneration and neglecting the past. After five months of 
military service, in 2010, he had deserted his regiment and declared his conscientious 
objection: “I will not be the soldier of an army that is not Muslim. Remaining quiet 
before cruelty, is cruelty itself. From now on, I no longer am a soldier.”241  
Two years after his declaration, he reflects on his dilemmas regarding his 
ideology and declaration. While the expectations of his mother and child tend to picture 
him as a soldier obedient to his nation, his interactions with individuals from various 
economic and political background has led him to re-evaluate his former ideology: 
“When I deserted the military and came back home, at the dinner table 
my mother told me that she had raised me to become a soldier. My son, 
who is 6 years old now, thinks that I am the Mehmetçik. How am I 
supposed to remain loyal to my declaration?! … We have discussed with 
socialists, anarchists, friends from all different political backgrounds. 
After hearing nationalism from their point of view, now I sometimes feel 
embarrassed to say that I am a nationalist. How am I to stay loyal to my 
declaration?!”242 
 
Gizem Altınordu is a woman objector who bases her arguments on religious 
foundations. In her declaration she underlines that she would not respect any authority 
but that of god. Not only does she succumb to the other female objectors’ statements on 
being an indirect subject to military practices, she also adds the alienation she feels due 
to the headscarf she wears—an issue Aydemir also had also brought up.243 
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3.2.7. Environmentalist, Disabled, Anticapitalist, and High School Student 
Objectors 
 
Keeping away from categorizing the smaller groups of objectors as others, in 
this section four additional objection types will be brought up. 
The first is the environmentalists. Although we cannot speak of a separate group 
as environmentalist objectors, we still can discuss environmentalism as a subject of 
concern widely pronounced in the declarations of objectors in all categories. These 
objectors describe war as a destruction brought by humans upon humans as well as 
nature and the ecosystem. In a naïve but sincere declaration, İbrahim Yıldız relates 
nature to himself as family: “Watermelon seed is my sister, mount Everest, my 
neighbor; cuckoo is my uncle, the Pacific, my aunt.”244  
The objectors with disabilities are probably the most unheard group, for they are 
not required to serve in the army, but are given the option to complete their service in 
one single day. In one declaration of objection, five disabled individuals have drawn 
attention to this issue. In the declaration, they have stated that “the biggest reason for 
the physically disabled is war.” They had described the one-day-service option and the 
support of the media for the individuals participating in this service as “an ugly 
propaganda for war and militarism,” and had objected to presenting their lives “as 
expandable in the shade of arms.”245 Both because they are not required to serve and 
because their bodies are subjected to propaganda for militarism and nationalism, the 
disabled objectors can be defined as the group that best symbolizes the antimilitarist 
intentions of conscientious objection. 
Anticapitalist and socialist objectors should also be noted. Although they cannot 
be categorized as a separate group as they work in cooperation with all objectors, their 
claims are significant both because they diverge from the dominant armed-struggle 
militancy of the left wing movements in Turkey, and because of the systemic 
perspective they bring to conscientious objection. Deniz Özgür explains the reason for 
the left wing for not favoring conscientious objection by referring to the pacifist and 
nonviolent acts of the movement; pacifism and pure nonviolence, in the eyes of 
socialists, were reproduction of the very tools of oppression used by the dominant 
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powers.
246
 Therefore he views conscientious objection as “a symbolic stance” 247  that 
has to have a mission beyond objecting compulsory military service, and take up 
antimilitarism with an anticapitalist outlook, for example, by approaching the issue 
through the lens of capitalism, class and hegemony.  
The youngest group of objectors are the high school students gathered around 
anarchist organizations. Defining militarism as “the condition in which people leave 
their own thoughts and conscience aside, definitively obey and learn the art of 
killing,”248   liken schools to barracks, and argue that they experience militarism at 
school with its entire rigor.
249
  
 
 
3.3. Interaction and Cooperation with Other NGOs and Political Parties 
 
Prior to stating the collaborations of conscientious objectors with political 
parties and NGOs, the lack of institutional structure among the conscientious objectors 
has to be underlined. That is to say, collaboration occurs not on institutional but 
network basis. Having said that, two political parties and three major NGOs will be 
defined here that give support to conscientious objectors.  
Given the fact that conscientious objection as a movement in Turkey takes its 
roots from anarchist organizations, collaboration with political parties deserves 
attention. There are two important parties that give support to conscientious objection. 
The first is the line of Kurdish parties. In Chapter 3.1., Zübeyir Aydar of Democracy 
Party is noted to have given a draft bill on conscientious objection in 1994. Peace and 
Democracy Party, the current political representative of Kurdish movement, has proved 
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itself to be a major supporter of conscientious objection as well. One of the 
parliamentarians from the party, Sebahat Tuncel, has also given a draft bill on 
conscientious objection, though the status of the bill is still unknown.
250
  
The Greens and Left Future Party (former Greens), also include conscientious 
objection in their agenda.
251
 In a January 2010 Grand Chamber Decision, the party had 
related conscientious objection to the weight that the military has on political and social 
life, questioned the “sacredness of the army,” and described it as the place where the 
military chain of command is imposed and militarist structure reproduced.
252
 Therefore 
they demanded conscientious objection as a right. With regards to their connection with 
the conscientious objectors, party member Alper Akyüz noted that it was the party that 
approached the conscientious objectors in the first place.
253
 
The first NGO organization is the Human Rights Association. The association 
has given support to the objectors in various areas, especially in organizing press release 
events for objection declarations; the association has hosted various public declarations. 
They had also given support to the families of imprisoned objectors.  
A second NGO is Amnesty International, who does not run campaigns on 
conscientious objection, but only runs campaigns for objectors who are imprisoned as 
the organization views them to be prisoners of conscience. As noted above, Osman 
Murat Ülke and Halil Savda were among the two objectors on whom international 
campaigns were organized. Burcu Türkay of Amnesty International also reminds the 
significance of celebrity Amnesty International activists for lobbying; when the rock 
band U2 had come to Turkey and paid a visit to the Prime Minister, they were also 
directed to bring up conscientious objection as an international concern watched by 
Amnesty International.
254
   
Finally, there is the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, who does not 
specifically focus on conscientious objectors, but focus on mistreatment of detainees, 
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including conscientious objectors. They also give support to traumatized families. 
Hürriyet Şener, coordinator of the Foundation in Istanbul, also is a conscientious 
objector.
255
 In April 2012, in cooperation with other objectors, they had paid a visit to 
Constitution Conciliation Commission, demanding the right.
256
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CONCLUSION 
 
The study pointed at the militarist elements in Turkish politics and society. 
Based on the antimilitarist rhetoric used by the conscientious objection movement, it 
sought to see the connections between the two theoretically, historically, and 
practically. The thesis holds that the Republic of Turkey is established on a hegemonic 
founding ideology that is centralist, unitarist and militarist. One of the two major means 
of maintaining and justifying this ideology is compulsory military service. The fact that 
Turkey remains the only member state to the Council of Europe that does not recognize 
conscientious objection and the heavy sentences it gives to conscientious objectors 
makes the functional and ideological essence of military service visible. On one hand, 
the various coup d’etats, the significance of general staff in decision making, the 
inauditability of military expenditures, the independence of the military judiciary, and 
the power of militarily-owned companies in economy makes the military an 
autonomous institution with great impact on the state. On the other hand, military has 
rised to the level of publicly highest regarded institution, the military service appears as 
a culturalized establishment along with its values and ethnically and sexually coded 
hierarchy. In this framework, the acts of civil disobedience taken by the conscientious 
objectors in Turkey along with their criticisms on the Kurdish issue, militarism, 
nationalism, androcentrism and heterosexism do not simply initiate a discussion of 
citizenship but shatter the core values upon which the state is founded. The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has been putting forth 
recommendations to Turkey for recognizing the right to conscientious objection, and the 
criticisms of the European Commission on Turkey’s democratic credentials based on 
the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, reflect the significance of the 
issue from the perspective of the European communities as well. In this regard, 
conscientious objection movement, due its radical but nonviolent nature, carries a 
transformative potential that could alter the static mindset of the Turkish nation with 
regards to cultural militarization, and push the Turkish state for further democratization 
and civilianization via its claims for conscientious objection. 
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